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ABSTRACT

Author: Peng, Didun. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: August 2018
Title: Quality Improvement along Supply Chain.
Committee Chair: Robert Plante
Product quality is the core competitiveness of a brand, prompting brand-owner continuously to
pursue. Learning curve is the tool to improve product quality by variance reduction. At the same
time, knowledge depreciation with its negative effects attracts attention. Thus, a comprehensive
learning curve is introduced in this dissertation. This research focus to explore the quality
improvement along the supply chain. There are three contributions in this dissertation: 1) it
provides the supply chain’s optimal distribution of quality improvement to manufacture and its
suppliers; 2) it shows the benefit from coordinated quality improvement among the supply chain;
3) it illustrates the benefit from increased demand and decreased cost from quality improvement.

Three models are presented consecutively in this dissertation. The first model assists the supply
chain to coordinate all suppliers for quality investment. Based on the traditional learning curve,
the comprehensive learning model is introduced in order to better understand the knowledge
accumulation effect. Autonomous learning, induced learning and their respective knowledge
depreciation effects are considered in this model. The product quality is measured from several
aspects, and each aspect linearly depends on the component quality. Therefore, suppliers’ quality
improvement contribute to the end product quality. The second model further considers each
outsourced components have interaction effects. To better understand knowledge forgetting effect,
it adopt Weibull distribution to simulate producing disruption. What’s more, it considers the
optimal quality investment for the whole producing system and a suboptimal quality investment
when there is no coordination in the system (Dyadic Supply Chain). Without coordination, every
supplier is trying to save her own quality cost, but the total quality cost is higher than the
coordinated system. Thus, incentives are necessary to these suppliers to cooperate in quality
improvement. In addition, the second model provides existence proof of the optimal solution.
Since the previous models using variance reduction to save cost, it increases demand as well. The

xi
third model starts to consider demand increasing and quality saving simultaneously. Similar to
model 2, the third model compares the optimal quality efforts under the coordinated system and
the sub-optimal quality efforts under un-coordinated system. Generally, the coordinated system is
more efficient. With coordination, 1) marginality is eliminated; 2) cost is lower; 3) demand is
higher from higher quality. Since supplier invest more with cooperation, incentives is required to
all suppliers.

1

INTRODUCTION

The research presented in this dissertation is trying to discuss organizational learning, which could
lower product producing cost and improving product quality among the supply chain from supplier,
brand-owner and retailer. At the same time, higher quality would increase the demand even with
higher selling price. Hence, additional profit is possible from lower cost and higher demand. In
order to utilize organizational learning achieving more profit, based on learning curve, my research
first considers the comprehensive learning curve, which considers autonomous and induced
learning along with their respective knowledge depreciation. Second, my research considers how
organizational learning reduce quality cost in the supply chain when product is assembling from
outsourced components. Further, organization learning improving product quality is discussed in
my research as well. Finally, my research shows the whole supply chain could get additional profit
as long as suppliers, brand-owner could cooperate. This dissertation progressively discuss a series
of problems particularly associated with quality-improvement, demand-increase and cooperation
between supplier and brand-owner.

1.1

Comprehensive Learning Curve

Learning curve is a traditional tool to describe producing time cost reducing from repeating work.
The more experience, the shorter producing time. This fact was first discovered in 1936 when
Wright analysis the aircraft productivity. Hence, knowledge accumulation is autonomous and
uncontrollable. Later, people find such experience could save producing cost from other aspects.
The best model to depict learning effect is exponential model. At the same time, producer may
realize that such experience is so valuable and is willing to pay for some experience. Then, learning
curve should extend to this level. This kind of knowledge from managerial activity is induced
learning. Later, knowledge accumulates from learning, and get lost from disruption or forgetting.
In order to consider all the facts, we proposed a comprehensive learning curve, which consider
autonomous learning, induced learning and their respective depreciation. In order to show how
accumulated knowledge improve the quality, we introduced Taguchi (1986) squared deviation
model, a core part of Six Sigma theorem. We used this model to show how organizational learning
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reduce the product measurement variation. In other words, the goal of comprehensive learning
curve is reduce performance measurement variance through knowledge accumulation. Some
knowledge accumulates unconsciously and some accumulates from elaborate plan.

1.2

Comprehensive Learning Curve on Supply Chain

Comprehensive learning model could efficiently reduce product measurement variance. Though
there is a cost to get knowledge from induced learning, it worth sometime. The question arise to
what is the optimal amount of induced learning. Knowledge brings the quality cost down but
additional learning cost incurs. Nowadays, the production process has a complicated system. The
process from raw material to end product has a strict structured supply chain. The up-stream
supplier components show a compounding effect on down steam end product. In addition, since
there are multiple components for the end product, and these components usually come from
various suppliers. The optimal induced learning amount along the supply chain for each supplier
and for the assembler in order to save the total quality cost is the discussed in my research. Besides
the optimal induced learning amount for cooperative system, my research talks the uncooperative
system. Since the manufacturer and the suppliers have their own profit, each one are pursuing their
own profit. Our research discussed the induced learning amount without coordination as well. In
particular, we talk about the un-coordinated system from the marginality

1.3

Dissertation Outline

The rest of this dissertation consists of four parts. Chapter 2 develops comprehensive learning
model to consider autonomous learning, induced learning and the associated depreciation effects.
An observed data is used to verify this model. With the comprehensive learning, this chapter is
able to provide the optimal investments in induced learning while product performances depend
on several independent supplier components performance. A total system cost model is then
constructed via incorporating the progress function to obtain the minimum cost quality targets
allocation. We use a numerical example of internal supplier process to demonstrate this model and
to assess the sensitivity of the optimal solutions to different model parameters
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Based on Chapter 2, Chapter 3 further consider components interaction effect while disruption
occurs accidently or strategically in the cooperative supply chain or un-cooperative supply chain.
Planned disruptions is necessary in order to make the whole producing process runs smooth.
During the planned disruption or break, employee could get some training and the most important
is that the system could get regular recondition in order to maintain uptime until the next break.
We used a numerical example to show the benefit from our model and we compare the induced
learning amount and quality cost under coordinated and un-coordinated system.

In Chapter 4, we consider the additional profit from increased demand as well. Chapter 2 and 3
showed the comprehensive learning curve could reduce the product quality cost from variance
reduction along the supply chain. Since variance is a direct index for product, smaller variance
means higher quality, which prompts the demand. We find that managerial quality effort could
reduce quality and enhance demand simultaneously. Chapter 4 considers marginality as well. We
find that system with cooperation could bring more benefit to brand-owner, suppliers and
customers. This is because that under cooperation, there are more quality effort is necessary. We
used a numerical example to show this point by comparing quality investment and additional
benefits.

Lastly, Chapter 5 summarize the contributions of this dissertation and introduce several topics for
further research.
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MINIMUM COST ALLOCATION OF QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT GOALS: THE EFFECTS OF KNOWLEDGE
DEPRECIATIONBEFORE YOU SUBMIT

2.1

Introduction for learning curve

The management of organizational knowledge has drawn attention among various areas of
industry and research (Hatch and Mowery 1998, Argote 1999, Lapre et al. 2000). In particular,
quality-based organizational learning has received extensive study (Fine 1986, Li and Rajagopalan
1998b, Mukherjee et al. 1998). Recent research efforts have focused on the practice and impact
of induced learning resulting from intentional managerial investments in learning activities.
Induced learning can be used both to accelerate quality improvement (Ittner et al. 2001, Serel et
al. 2003) and to counteract the opportunity loss in quality improvement associated with process
disruptions (Howick and Eden 2007, Wang et al. 2013). In this regard, Wang et al. (2013)
proposed a model that accounted for the deleterious effect of process disruptions when allocating
quality improvement targets to suppliers and obtained the cost minimizing level of induced
learning to offset the cost associated with such disruptions.

While organizational learning has been explored in its various components, research on knowledge
depreciation is very limited. Knowledge depreciation, or forgetting, is as common and complex a
phenomenon as learning, but it is often neglected or simply associated with disruptions within the
dimension of autonomous learning. Every year due to the involuntary loss of acquired knowledge,
companies suffer immense cost (de Holan et al. 2004). Hence, it is crucial to account for
knowledge depreciation and its different forms in managerial decision making. Even though the
model proposed by Wang et al. (2013) focused on the effect of disruptions, its formulation did not
consider knowledge depreciation and therefore sets the stage for the categorization and inclusion
of knowledge depreciation so that a more accurate induced learning investment strategy can be
achieved. Particularly, we are interested in assessing to what extent forgetting and knowledge
decay affect optimal induced learning investments as well as resulting improvements in quality.
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2.2

Forgetting and Knowledge Decay

Differentiating autonomous and induced learning essentially suggests that there are two streams
of knowledge creation and accumulation. One is through autonomous learning by doing and the
other through the activities and programs that are designed to purposively induce learning. Forces
that drive and sustain these two learning dynamics are distinct in nature (Dutton and Thomas 1984,
Li and Rajagopalan 1998b). Thus it is reasonable to base our discussion of knowledge depreciation
on two separate knowledge accumulating processes.

This is also consistent with Yelle’s

proposition that “the phenomenon of forgetting and relearning needs more attention in the context
of the various components of learning,” (Yelle 1979) and the categorization of accidental
forgetting by de Holan et al. (2004).

As for autonomous learning, forgetting has been observed in various empirical studies. Keachie
and Fontana (1966) may have been the first to recognize explicitly the phenomenon of unlearning
between production runs. Batchelder et al. (1969) presented an example of a “scallop” learning
curve in which manufacturing costs rise abruptly and then decline. According to Batchelder et al.
(1969), the “scallop” is generally caused by a major interruption in the production process. Ballof
(1970) noted that the total productivity “losses” associated with frequent interruptions of a startup may greatly outweigh inventory costs and other considerations. While intermittent production
is identified as a critical cause for forgetting, scholars have found that other factors, such as worker
turnover and product or process changes, also cause forgetting (Darr et al. 1995, Li and
Rajagopalan 1998a). For instance, a close examination of the data provided by Badiru (1995)
shows that quality is affected by both production down time and production rate. Forgetting occurs
not only during production down time, but also when the production rate is decreased. Although
various causal factors were claimed to be associated with forgetting during production, most of
the proposed forgetting models only account for production disruptions (Badiru 2006). As an
attempt to account for other factors, we recognize that these factors often result in decreases in
production rates (Ash and Smith-Daniels 2004). And Benkard (2000) found evidence that
“experience may depreciate in times of falling production rates.” Hence, we will also account for
forgetting that is concurrent with the retardation of production.
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In the scope of knowledge accumulation through investments in induced learning activities, the
literature has not yet addressed forgetting that represents the loss of knowledge accumulated from
induced learning activities. We call this forgetting knowledge decay to distinguish it from the
forgetting that occurs due to process disruption.

The psychology literature suggests three

situations where knowledge is likely to decay: (i) lack of similarity between the conditions of
encoding and retention of material learned, (ii) old learning interfering with new learning, and (iii)
interruption in learning (Badiru 2006).

As transparency and interaction among companies

increases, knowledge is rapidly created and transferred through additional training programs
(Malhotra and Ritzman 1999), which results in frequent occurrence of these scenarios. Therefore,
knowledge decay is especially relevant to today’s organizations. Empirical studies show that
retention of induced knowledge depends on the completeness of induced learning. Negligence of
processes, like validation, codification or institutionalization, can impede learning and cause
involuntary knowledge decay (Lapre et al. 2000, de Holan et al. 2004). To account for this, we
introduce the concept of induced learning capacity.

Under-capacity learning implies an

insufficient learning period or a lack of follow-up effort to achieve proficiency and retention
(Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2006) and will be subject to knowledge decay.

2.3

Development of the Progress Function

Traditionally, quality cost is determined by the expenditure of ensuring conformance to product
specifications. However, more contemporary studies have provided theoretical and empirical
support for a more general quality cost model for continuous improvement (Ittner 1996, Li and
Rajagopalan 1998b).

Within the continuous improvement framework, we adopt Taguchi’s quadratic quality loss
function, where quality cost depends on the squared deviation of a process design variable from
its target value (Taguchi 1986). Hence for a single supplier process with design variable X(t), the
quality cost, C(t), is defined as,
=
C (t )
=
=

2
E  k ( X (t ) − τ ) 
2
k σ X2 ( t ) + ( µ X ( t ) − τ ) 



2
=
kσ X ( t ) (assuming µ X ( t ) τ )

(1)
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where,
E[·]

= expectation operator,

µ X (t )

= mean of X(t) in period of (t − 1, t],

σ X2 ( t )

= variance of X(t) in period of (t − 1, t],

τ

= the target value for X(t),

k

= the quadratic cost coefficient, which is the expected cost per unit of squared
deviation of X(t) from τ and can be estimated using techniques described by
Sullivan (1984).

The last equation in (1) holds because it’s assumed that the process target τ for the mean has
previously been attained for this process (i.e., µ X ( t ) = τ ), using methodologies such as those
proposed by Plante (2001). This usually involves a one-time process adjustment and is relatively
easier to achieve. Based on equation (1), quality depends on the process variance and thereby
quality cost can be reduced through decreasing process variance σ X2 ( t ) .
2.3.1

Production and Learning Capacity

Quality-based learning (Ittner et al., 2001) suggests that quality cost decreases as
knowledge/experience accumulates, which can be described by a progress function (learning
curve). The conventional progress function follows the power law with an agglomerate experience
term (Argote and Epple 1990). However, Wang et al. (2013) recently introduced an extended
learning model, which separates experience accumulated from autonomous and induced learning
and also accounts for production disruptions. Their model facilitates the decomposition of
knowledge depreciation and provides the basis to separately include forgetting and knowledge
decay in our current study. In particular, we introduce production and induced learning capacities
(p and q in equation (2) below) where we postulate that, relative to the full capacity scenario,
forgetting and knowledge decay occur whenever there exist under-capacity production and/or
under-capacity induced learning, respectively. In this way we are able to capture a broader range
of forgetting causal factors besides intermittent production, minimizing the underestimation of the
adverse effects of knowledge depreciation. The revised progress function is
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=
σ X2 ( t ) C (0) [G (t ) p ]
C (t ) k=

− λA

[ L (t ) q ] λ ,
−

I

(2)

where
t

= the end of current planning period (t − 1, t],

C (0)

= initial quality cost at the beginning of the time horizon,

G (t )

= cumulative proportions of full-capacity production (for autonomous learning)
up till time t ( 0 ≤ G (t ) ≤ t ) ,
= cumulative proportions of full-capacity for induced learning up till time t

L (t )

( 0 ≤ L (t ) ≤ t ) ,
λA

= autonomous learning parameter for the process,

λI

= induced learning parameter ( λI > 0 ) ,

p

= maximum production capacity for the process under consideration per period
(in units),

q

= maximum induced learning capacity per period (in units).

If we take partial derivatives of (2) with respect to the two sources of knowledge, G (t ) and L(t )
respectively, we have (t is omitted)
∂C
− λ −1
−λ
=
C (0) ( −λA p )( Gp ) A ( Lq ) I =
( −λA pG −1 ) C ,
∂G

∂C
−λ
− λ −1
C (0) ( Gp ) A ( −λI q ) ( Lq ) I =
=
−λI qL−1 ) C .
(
∂L

(3)
(4)

Equations (3) and (4) suggest that the change of quality cost, C (t ) , is proportional to the current
level of quality cost. And cumulative autonomous learning, G (t ) , and cumulative induced learning
L (t )

, interactively determine the rate of quality cost reduction. These equations are explicit

representations of the continuous improvement differential equation introduced by Zangwill and
Kantor (1998).

Model (2) suggests that process variance and thereby quality cost depend on the combined effects
of both autonomous and induced learning. Adopting the primal technological-based concept of
capacity, p and q are the maximum level of production and induced learning activities within a
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planning period that we could reasonably expect to attain given the capital stock, the state of
technology, and the efficient and full utilization of all factors (Morrison 1985). A similar concept,
termed performance, was introduced by Carlson and Rowe (1976) in their study of learning and
forgetting. Their level of performance ranged from 0% to 100% of production capacity. Therefore
the actual amount of cumulative autonomous learning (production) and induced learning are G (t ) p
and L(t )q (both in units) respectively, such that,
=
G (t )

=
L(t )

G (t − 1) + g t ,

(5)

L(t − 1) + lt ,

(6)

where
g t = proportion of full-capacity production over (t − 1, t] (0 ≤ g t ≤ 1),
lt =

proportion of full-capacity induced learning over (t − 1, t] (0 ≤ lt ≤ 1).

We assume that at the beginning of the current planning period (t − 1, t], all information regarding
the previous period (t − 2, t − 1] is available, which in practice becomes increasingly feasible due
to continuous advances in information technology and in data analysis/estimation. Thus G (t − 1)
and L (t − 1) are observed. Both g t and lt are within [0, 1]. When g t = lt = 1, production and
induced learning are both at full-capacity. And 0 < g t , lt < 1` implies under-capacity production and
under-capacity induced learning, resulting in knowledge depreciation. In this Chapter, lt is the
decision variable while g t is set to pre-specified or planned production levels.

2.3.2

Model of Forgetting and Knowledge Decay

The form of our model is chosen based on a comparative study by Nembhard (2001), in which up
to 14 forgetting models are compared, including both statistical and deterministic models. The
comparison criteria are (i) efficiency in measuring forgetting, (ii) stability in productivity
predictions across the workforce, and (iii) balance of undershoots and overshoots of predictions of
productivity following a break. According to the test results, the linear model consistently yielded
good predictions among the statistical models investigated by Nembhard (2001). Hence forgetting
and knowledge decay will both adopt the linear form in our model.
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Further, in the learning and forgetting literature, factors that influence the extent of forgetting have
been extensively investigated. The three most common factors are (a) interruption length, the
longer of which leads to greater loss of knowledge; (b) amount of accumulated knowledge prior
to the interruption, which is often deemed the most important determinant of forgetting in
psychology, and (c) nature of the tasks, where forgetting is more prominent for procedural tasks
than declarative tasks, and also more for cognitive tasks than motor tasks (Nembhard 2001). In the
context of this research, the first two factors are respectively reflected in the unachieved capacity
and accumulated knowledge prior to any drop in production or induced learning. Factor (c) is
accounted for via the differentiation of two types of learning, autonomous and induced.

We consider the following models for knowledge deterioration,

G (t )
=
L(t )
=

[ aG (t − 1) + g ] + a [G (t − 1) + g ] ,
t

t

2

[bL(t − 1) + l ] + b [ L(t − 1) + l ] ,
t

t

2

0 ≤ a ≤ 1,

(7)

0 ≤ b ≤1,

(8)

where
a

= forgetting parameter of knowledge accumulated from autonomous learning. The
proportion of accumulated knowledge that is retained.

b

= knowledge decay parameter for induced learning. The proportion of accumulated
induced learning that is retained.

Then equation (2) becomes

  [ aG (t − 1) + g t ] + a [G (t − 1) + g t ]  
C (t ) = C (0)  
 p
2
 


− λA

  [bL(t − 1) + lt ] + b [ L(t − 1) + lt ]  
× 
 q
2
 


− λI

.

(9)

Note that forgetting and knowledge decay are manifested in the discount factors, a and b. Further,
forgetting and knowledge decay are embedded within the two progress function components of
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accumulated production and induced learning, respectively. That is, it provides a direct means of
reducing the body of knowledge accumulated through both autonomous and induced learning.
When a = b = 1, equations (7) and (8) reduce to (5) and (6), respectively. The values of a and b are
related to the characteristics of the workforce, the nature of production, and the type of induced
learning program implemented (Lapre et al. 2000, Nembhard 2001) and they are assumed to be
independent of the learning parameters. Equation (9) is a model with multiple parameters and the
estimation of learning and depreciation parameters requires a non-linear estimation procedure, an
example of which we will provide in the next section. In a study of aircraft production dynamics,
Benkard (2000) used a nonlinear estimator based on the General Method of Moments to estimate
the learning and forgetting coefficients for an autonomous learning model. Epple et al. (1991)
adopted a maximum likelihood method to estimate the depreciation rate in autonomous learning.
Therefore, we assume that the learning parameters, λA and λI , as well as depreciation parameters,
a and b can be estimated from historical data. In Section 4, using an augmented data set from
Badiru (1995), we provide an estimation procedure of these parameters that minimizes the sum of
squared deviations of rework unit rate (Darr et al. 1995).

Thus far, we have derived our quality-based learning and forgetting model for a single supplier
production process X (t ) . In Section 3, this model will be applied to a system of suppliers’
processes X i (t ) , where i denotes the i-th supplier. We seek an optimal allocation of induced
learning by considering the tradeoff between investment in induced learning and the potential
positive impact of induced learning, including counteracting forgetting and thereby promoting
continuous quality improvement.

2.3.3

Impact of the Learning Model Parameters on Cost

To provide some practical credence to (9), we assess whether this model reflects learning curve
patterns that are routinely observed in practice. To illustrate the effect of forgetting and knowledge
decay on cost reduction described by (9), four expected cost graphs are drawn over 25 planning
periods (Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4). For each illustration, the autonomous and induced learning
parameters,

and , are both assumed to be 0.2. Under-capacity production occurs in periods 1

12
through 3, 6 through 9, 13, 14 and 23, with = 25%, 50%, 75%, 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 0%, 90%,
50%, respectively. We assume that induced learning only occurs in periods 1 through 3, 9 through
12 and 18 through 21, with = 75%, 50%, 25%, 100%, 75%, 50%, 25%, 100%, 75%, 50%, 25%,
respectively. p and q are assumed to be 100 and 25 (units), respectively.

Figure 1 Disruption Effect
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Figure 2 Knowledge Decay Effect

Figure 3 Forgetting Effect
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Figure 4 Knowledge Depreciaiton Effect
Figure 1 represents the effect of under-capacity production or process disruption which was
modeled by Wang et al. (2013). For comparison, each figure also gives a graph that depicts the
effect on costs without forgetting (i.e., a = 1, b = 1) and operating at full capacity (i.e.,
g t= lt= 1.0, for all t), which we call the base case. Figure 2 illustrates the case when there is only

under-capacity induced learning (i.e., a = 1) and therefore only knowledge decay is present with
decay parameter b = 0.95. It’s obvious that new induced learning efforts steepen the learning curve
and that discontinuance of induced learning leads to plateaus on the curve. Figure 3 considers the
case when there is retardation of production with forgetting parameter a = 0.005, but no knowledge
decay (i.e., b = 1). The effect of forgetting causes regressions on the learning curve, which are the
‘scallops.’ Figure 4 illustrates the case when both under-capacity production and induced learning
are accounted for, where forgetting and knowledge decay are both present with a = 0.005 and b =
0.005. The resultant progression of cost is consistent with our expectation and what is observed
from real data (Badiru 1995, Nembhard 2001), lending some credibility to the model in (9).
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2.4

Development of the Progress Function

Assume a supply chain consists of one manufacturer and multiple suppliers. The manufacturer has
a set of M performance measures, Y j , j = 1, 2, ..., M, each of which is influenced by a common set
of N design variables (factors), X 1 , X 2 ,..., X N , associated with N supplier processes. The general
quality cost model for each design variable is given in Section 2. Our goal is to find the optimal
quality improvement targets for each supplier so as to minimize the system’s total expected cost.
Moskowitz et al. (2001) first introduced a total system cost model in the context of allocating
quality improvement targets. In this section, we extend their procedure to develop the total system
cost, incorporating both learning and forgetting as shown in (9).

Assuming that there are no interaction effects among the supplier processes, the performance
measures relate linearly to design variables at time t as follows,
=
Y j (t )

N

∑ c X (t ) + ε
ij

i

j

,

j= 1, 2, ..., M,

(10)

i =1

where,
t
Y j (t )

= the end of current planning period (t − 1, t],
= j-th performance measure (for the manufacturer) over the period (t − 1, t],

X i (t ) =

design variable by the i-th supplier over the period (t − 1, t],

cij

= marginal effect of the i-th design variable on the j-th performance measure,

εj

= independent noise with mean 0 and constant variance σ ε2 , and ε h and ε k are
independent when h ≠ k.

2.4.1

Impact of the Learning Model Parameters on Cost

Applying Taguchi’s model (1) and (9) to each individual supplier process, we have for the i-th
supplier (i = 1, 2, ..., N)
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Ci (t ) = kiσ X2 i ( t )

   ai Gi (t − 1) + g i ,t  + ai Gi (t − 1) + g i ,t   
= Ci (0)   
 pi 
2
 
 

− λi , A

  bi Li (t − 1) + li ,t  + bi  Li (t − 1) + li ,t   
×  
 qi 
2
 
 

− λi , I

,

(11)

where

σ X2 (t ) = variance of the i-th supplier process over period (t − 1, t],
i

ki

= quadratic cost coefficient,

pi

= maximum production capacity (in units),

qi

= maximum induced learning capacity (in units),

Ci (0) = initial quality cost at the beginning of the time horizon,

Gi (t ) = cumulative proportions of full-capacity production (autonomous learning) up

till time t,
Li (t )

= cumulative proportions of full-capacity induced learning up till time t,

g i ,t

= realized proportion of full-capacity production over (t − 1, t],

li ,t

= allocated proportion of full-capacity induced learning over (t − 1, t],

λi , A

= autonomous learning rate,

λi , I

= induced learning rate,

ai

= forgetting parameter, 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1

bi

= knowledge parameter, 0 ≤ bi ≤ 1 .

From equation (11), where Gi (t − 1) > 0 and Li (t − 1) > 0 , the ratio of Ci (t ) to Ci (t − 1) is:
σ X2 (t )
i

σ X2 (t −1)
i

  ai Gi (t − 1) + g i ,t  + ai Gi (t − 1) + g i ,t  
= 

2Gi (t − 1)



− λi , A

 bi Li (t − 1) + li ,t  + bi  Li (t − 1) + li ,t  
× 

2 Li (t − 1)


and hence

− λi , I

,

(12)
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σ= σ
2
X i (t )

2
X i ( t −1)

g i ,t (1 + ai ) 

 ai + 2G (t − 1) 


i

− λi , A

l (1 + bi ) 

× bi + i ,t

2 Li (t − 1) 


− λi , I

.

(13)

Therefore, the total supplier quality cost is:
≡

QCS (t )

N

N

∑ Ci (t ) =
∑ kiσ X2 (t )
N

∑kσ

=

i

i =1

2.4.2

2
X i ( t −1)

(14)

i

=i 1 =i 1

g i ,t (1 + ai ) 

 ai + 2G (t − 1) 


i

− λi , A

l (1 + bi ) 

× bi + i ,t

2 Li (t − 1) 


− λi , I

.

(15)

Total Manufacturer Quality Cost

Assuming that the supplier processes are independent, via equation (10), the resultant mean and variance
of a manufacturer’s j-th performance measure Y j (t ) (j = 1, 2, ..., M) at time t are, respectively,
N

µY (t ) = ∑ cij µ X (t )
j

i

i =1

=
σ Y2j (t )

N

∑c σ
2
ij

i =1

2
X i (t )

,

+ σ ε2

(16)

.

(17)

Similar to the model for a supplier’s quality cost, the total manufacturer quality cost is also represented by
a quadratic loss function as follows,

M



E  ∑ K j ( Y j (t ) − T j ) 

=
QCM (t )

2

 j =1

M

∑K

=

j =1

j



(

j

 N
i1
=j 1 =

j




M

=

)

σ 2 + µ − T 2 
Y (t )
j

 Y ( t )

∑ K j  ∑ cij2σ X2 (t ) + σ ε2 
i

( assuming µ

Yj (t )

= Tj

)

(18)

−λ
−λ

g i ,t (1 + ai ) 
li ,t (1 + bi ) 


 N 2 2
2
= ∑ K j ∑ cijσ X ( t −1)  ai +
b
+
+
σ
,

ε
  i 2 L (t − 1) 
2Gi (t − 1) 
=j 1 =



i
 i 1

i ,A

M

i

where

i ,I

(19)
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T j = the target or nominal value for the j-th performance measure Y j (t ) ,
K j = the quadratic coefficient for Y j (t ) .

Consistent with the assumption in (1), equation (18) follows, assuming the target T j has been achieved so
that µY ( t ) = T j . It is clear that the manufacturer can reduce its total expected quality cost by reducing
j

2
σ Y2 (t ) , through reductions in σ X ( t ) , i = 1, 2, ..., N.
i

j

2.4.3

Investment in Learning

Investment in induced learning depends on the allocated proportion of induced learning capacity
for each supplier, li ,t . In a supplier development program, the manufacturer and suppliers
collaboratively invest in a supplier’s learning process to reduce process variances and the cost is
shared proportionately for each party (Moskowitz et al. 2001). Since suppliers may be different in
process complexity, cost structure, experience level, etc., the learning cost coefficient varies from
supplier to supplier.

If we assume a quadratic relationship between the learning cost and the amount of induced learning,
the total investment in learning during the planning period (t − 1, t] for the i-th supplier is then,
LC X=
hi
i (t )

q}
{[ L (t ) − L (t − 1)] =
i

i

i

hi (qi li ,t ) 2 ,

(20)

where
hi

= the quadratic cost coefficient for the ith supplier.

Summing over all suppliers, the total induced learning investment is
N

LC (t ) = ∑ LC X i (t ) .

(21)

i =1

Note li ,t (i = 1, 2, ..., N) are the decision variables in the model. This quadratic learning cost model
was first proposed by Moskowitz et al. (2001). Wang et al. (2013) later adopted this model in their
study of induced learning activities used to counteract the negative effect of production disruptions
on quality improvement.
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2.4.4

Total Expected System Cost of Target Improvement Allocation

Combining the suppliers’ quality costs in (15), manufacturer’s quality cost in (19) and the learning
investment in (21), the total expected system cost at time t is
TECt = LC (t ) + QCS (t ) + QCM (t )
=

N

∑
i =1

−λ

g i ,t (1 + ai ) 

 LC X ( t ) + v X (t )  ai +

2Gi (t − 1) 



i ,A

i

i

l (1 + bi ) 

× bi + i ,t

2 Li (t − 1) 

=

N

− λi , I

M

2
+
σ
 ε ∑Kj
j =1


(22)

M

∑ TEC X (t ) + σ ε2 ∑ K j ,

(23)

i

=i 1 =j 1

where
M


=
v X i (t ) σ X2 i (t −1)  ki + ∑ K j cij2  ,
j =1



(24)

and TEC X (t ) is the total expected cost for supplier i,
i

TEC X ( t ) =
i

hi ( qi li ,t )

2

g (1 + ai ) 

+ v X ( t )  ai + i ,t

2Gi (t − 1) 

i

− λi , A

li ,t (1 + bi ) 

bi + 2 L (t − 1) 


i

− λi ,I

(25)

.

As shown in (23), disregarding the constant term σ ε2 ∑ j =1 K j , the total expected system cost, TECt,
M

may be partitioned by supplier and be minimized by independently minimizing TEC X (t ) , i = 1,
i

2, ..., N defined in (25). Minimum cost variance reduction targets σ X2 i (t ) for planning period (t −
1, t] can then be determined from (13). These variance targets are first obtained by determining
the optimal learning allocation 0 ≤ li*,t ≤ 1 that minimizes (25) for each supplier i independently.

2.4.5

Optimal Investment in Learning

Taking the first derivative of (25) with respect to the learning capacity gives,

20
∂TEC X ( t )
i

∂li ,t

li ,t (1 + bi ) 
 1 + bi 
2hi q l − λi , I β i 
=
 bi +

2 Li (t − 1) 
 2 Li (t − 1) 

− ( λi , I +1)

2
i i ,t

,

(26)

where
g (1 + ai ) 

β i v X (t )  ai + i ,t
=

2 Li ( t − 1) 


− λi , A

i

(27)

.

Taking the second derivative to assure that (25) is strictly convex in li,t:
∂ 2TEC X ( t )
i

∂li2,t

 1 + bi 
=
2hi q + λi , I ( λi , I + 1) β i 

 2 Li (t − 1) 
2
i

2

li ,t (1 + bi ) 

 bi +

2 Li (t − 1) 


− ( λi , I + 2 )

>0.

(28)

Since (28) is greater than 0, (25) is strictly convex in li,t and the optimal learning capacity can be
obtained by setting (26) equal to 0.

2.5

Development of the Progress Function

Our learning and forgetting model has a variety of applications in practice. For example, it is
applicable to systems with either external supplier processes or internal processes (or multistage
manufacturing processes). Furthermore, this model is relevant for processes that suffer significant
forgetting and knowledge decay, such as the food franchise industry with high turnover rate, health
care services with constant interruptions, and manufacturers with rapid change in technological
innovations (Darr et al. 1995, Shafer et al. 2001). In these cases, performance measures can be
service delivery time, number of malpractices, and product quality specifics. The design variables,
X i (t ) ’s,

represent sources of variation that describe key characteristics of supplier processes.

Using this model, the cost minimizing investment on induced learning activities to improve the
process and to potentially counteract forgetting can be attained.

In this section, a numerical example is presented to illustrate our methodology and to assess the
sensitivity of optimal induced learning allocations to several model parameters. We assess
sensitivity in terms of both direction of change in optimal induced learning as well as the
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magnitude of this change. An algebraic sensitivity analysis is provided in the Appendix (A1 to A4)
for direction of change, and is valid for all values of the model parameters. We will refer to these
results as we now consider the use a numerical example to assess the magnitude of change.

Since we can optimize separately for each supplier process, and to facilitate our discussion, we
will consider only one supplier process. This example considers the manufacture of an electronic
product consisting of a single internal sub-process (N = 1). The design variable, X 1 , influences a
single performance measure, Y (t ) . We assume that the current planning period is (4, 5], i.e. t = 5
in our implementation. The quadratic cost coefficients are estimated to be K = 500 for the
performance measure and k = 1000 for the design variable (Sullivan 1984) provides a procedure
for estimating these cost coefficients). And the initial variance at time t − 1 = 4 is σ X2 ( 4) = 22 . The
induced learning cost coefficient h is 50; the production and learning capacities are p = 5000 and
q = 50, respectively.

We will use an augmented version of the data set provided by Badiru (1995) to estimate the
learning and knowledge depreciation parameters. The data represents a 4-year monthly record of
a production process for electronics manufacturing. Absent data available to derive the proportion
of induced learning capacity directly, we augmented the data, consistent with results from Dorrah
et al. (1994), by equating this proportion to the complement of the proportion of production
capacity.

This assumption is plausible if one considers a decision scenario where there is a fixed amount of
resources, Ri, in period i that can be allocated to production and/or induced learning activities.
Hence, the allocation is apportioned as follows,
Ri g i + Ri li =
Ri , 0 ≤ g i , li ≤ 1 ,

(29a)

which clearly results in:
li = 1 − g i .

(29b)

We consider the rework/unit as a measure of quality improvement experienced over the 48-month
time period. For model estimation, we took the log transformation of equation (9) and used a
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nonlinear search algorithm to obtain an estimate of the learning and knowledge depreciation
parameters that minimize the sum of squared deviations of our model’s predictions from the log
of the observed data (Darr et al. 1995).
The resulting estimates for the autonomous learning and forgetting parameters are λA = 1.322 and
a = 0.960, respectively. Continuing, the estimates for the induced learning and knowledge decay
parameters are λI = 0.545

and

b = 0.289, respectively. The planned proportion of production

capacity is g5 = 0.5, and the accumulated production and induced learning experiences are
assumed to be G (4) = 3.0 and L(4) = 0.2. The linear function modeling the relationship between
the performance measure and the design variable is,
Y (t ) 2 X 1 (t ) + ε .
=

(30)

Table 1, first row, shows the resulting proportion of induced learning capacity suggested for period
5, the associated total expected cost and the target variance (note: The constraint imposed by
equation (29a) in the estimation of the learning and knowledge depreciation parameters is not
imposed when determining optimal levels of induced learning activities). Further, Figure 5 depicts
the change in Total Expected Cost as the proportion of induced learning capacity in period 5 ranges
from 0.0 to 1.0 which results in a clearly convex function as stated in Section 3.5. The cost
minimizing (optimal) proportion of induced learning capacity is 0.291 with a resulting expected
cost of $61,214 and a resulting expected process variance target of 16.89. Hence, an appropriate
quality improvement target for this process would be a variance of 16.89 in period 5, which
represents an expected decrease in process variance of about 23.24%. We call this the Base Case
and will use it in a comparative assessment of the sensitivity of total expected cost to changes in
selected model parameters.
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Table 1 Case Results

Figure 5 Base Case
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2.5.1

Optimal Investment in Learning

In the Appendix-A, we analytically determined the direction of change of the optimal proportion of induced
learning capacity for changes in several parameters. In the next few subsections, we will empirically assess
for our example problem, the magnitude of these changes on the cost minimizing allocation of the
proportion of induced learning capacity to changes in these same parameters. For each case, we will
compare the optimal proportion of induced learning capacity and the resulting total expected cost and
resulting process variance to those of the base case.

2.5.2

Impact of Knowledge Depreciation, (a, b)

From the results in the Appendix-A-1, If ai increases, indicating relatively better retention of the
knowledge gained from accumulated experience, the total expected cost TEC X (t ) is expected to
i

decrease. In this regard, since the system retains comparatively more experiential knowledge, it
can be expected to require less induced learning to minimize the cost, i.e., the optimal li*,t will be
lower. Similarly, if bi increases, the system suffers less knowledge loss, the expected total cost
will decrease and the necessary investment in induced learning can be reduced. The results for
cases 1 and 2 in Table 1 are consistent with these directional change results and show the sensitivity
of total expected cost to the presence and/or absence of knowledge depreciation, which is achieved
in our model through the removal of forgetting (a = 1) and/or the removal of knowledge decay
(Case 1: b = 1). Relative to the Base Case, which includes both forgetting and knowledge decay at
levels a = 0.96 and b = 0.289, the removal of knowledge decay (a = 0.96, b = 1) has decreased the
optimal induced learning rate from 0.291 to 0.206 of induced learning capacity. In comparison,
this effect is, understandably quite large relative to the effect of also removing the forgetting
parameter given the relatively low retention of accumulated induced learning (28.9%) to that of
accumulated autonomous learning (96%). The additional removal of forgetting (Case 2: a = 1, b =
1) has minimally decreased the optimal proportion of induced learning capacity from 0.206 to
0.201, as well as reducing process variance, relative to the Base case, from 16.89 to 12.29, for an
expected reduction in process variance of about 44.14%. Also, relative to the Base Case, the total
expected cost has been reduced from $61,214 to $41,896, a reduction of about 31.56%. These
results clearly depict the effects of not including the knowledge depreciation parameters (Cases 1
and 2) where (i) the optimal proportion of induced learning is underestimated (.206 in lieu of .291),
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(ii) the resulting total expected cost is underestimated ($41,896 in lieu of $61,214) and (iii) the
expected process variance is underestimated (12.29 in lieu of 16.89).

2.5.3

Impact of Planned Production, g 5

In the Appendix-A-2, increasing the level of planned production results in a decrease in the optimal
level of allocated induced learning as well as a decrease in total expected cost. Consistent with
these results, Cases 3 and 4 in Table 1 show the magnitude of these effects for increasing the planned
production in period 5. The three levels of g 5 , namely 0.50, 0.75 and 1.00, are chosen to represent the
magnitude of lost production, which is 1 − g 5 . As g 5 decreases, the planned production level deteriorates,
which leads to increases in all three resulting metrics: optimal proportion of induced learning capacity, total
expected costs and the expected process variance. On the other hand, as shown in Table 1, when production
increases towards full capacity, the process variance reduces from 16.89 to 15.67 to 14.60 for planned
production rates of 0.50, 0.75 and 1.00, respectively. And the optimal level of induced learning decreases
from 0.291 to 0.278 to 0.267, with resulting decreases in total expected costs from $61,214 to $56,686 to
$52,751 having a net decrease of about 13.83% in total expected costs relative to the base case. Here, again,
the effect of a low knowledge retention level for induced learning activities is evident. As production,
having a relatively higher learning rate as well as a higher retention of knowledge, increases the optimal
level of induced learning activities decreases.

2.5.4

Impact of Prior Variance, σ 42

The results derived in the Appendix-A-3 indicate that increasing variance in the period prior to the
planning period leads to an increase in the optimal level of induced learning as well as an increase
in the total expected cost. Consistent with these results, Cases 5 and 6 in Table 1 show that an
increase in the previous period process variance from 22 to 30 (Case 5) produces an increase in all
three metrics. The optimal induced learning rate increases from 0.291 to 0.392, resulting in an
increase for total expected cost from $61,214 to $79,072 and an increase in variance from 16.89
to 21.70. First, these relatively large process variances could imply that a supplier’s process may
be in the early stages of quality improvement, where it’s desirable to invest more in induced
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learning to reduce quality cost. Complex and/or more volatile processes will need higher
investments in training and other induced learning programs, since continual innovations and
changes inevitably place the process in the initial stages of a learning curve. Second, when the
process variance is higher, it suggests that a relatively larger induced learning level is more
economical to achieve a cost effective quality level. Third, for this problem, as process quality
improves from a process variance of 22 to 15 (Case 6), the induced learning effort required to
achieve the resulting process variance of 12.38 decreases from 0.291 to 0.243. These results
suggest that the initial process variance has a substantial effect on the optimal induced learning
rate and the resulting total expected cost and the resulting process variance. This suggests that
careful assessment of the suppliers’ processes is critical for the manufacturer to allocate cost
effective quality improvement (i.e., variance reduction) targets.

2.5.5

Impact of Induced Learning Parameter, λi , I

Wang et al. (2003) showed how effective an induced learning activity would have to be to counter
the impact of the forgetting parameter. In Section 4.1.2 we learned that continuing and/or
increasing planned production is particularly effective in reducing the effect of forgetting.
Furthermore, because a considerable amount of knowledge can be lost in the presence of process
disruptions, it is beneficial to have available effective induced learning activities. This is especially
important if process disruptions are expected to continue.

Through managerial intervention, induced learning activities can be designed that could achieve
relatively higher induced learning parameters of 1.0 (Case 7) or even 2.0 (Case 8) relative to
the .545 of the Base Case. Such gains in the induced learning parameter may be possible depending
on the combination of conceptual and operational learning that is used in the design of an induced
learning activity (Lapre et al. 2000). Such focused strategies could also lead to increased retention
of accumulated induced learning (i.e., decreased knowledge decay). Indeed, during process
disruptions the implementation of such effective induced learning activities could go a long way
in countering the effect of forgetting due to process disruption.
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For most practical cases, the results in the Appendix-A-4 suggest, that as the induced learning
parameter increases, the optimal level of induced learning will increase and the total expected cost
will decrease. This makes intuitive sense and the results depicted in Cases 7 and 8 in Table 1 are
consistent. Here, the impact of increasing the effectiveness of the induced learning activities leads
to an increase in the optimal proportion of induced learning capacity from 0.291in the Base Case
to 0.355 and 0.392, respectively. Further, as the induced learning parameter increases from 1.0 to
2.0, the expected process variance decreases from 13.16 to 7.85 with a simultaneous decrease in
total expected cost from $55,247 to $42,697. Furthermore, by simultaneously designing induced
learning activities that also increase the retention of knowledge the impact can be substantial. Case
9 ( λI = 2.0, b = 0.75) in Table 1 shows the impact of such designs where the Total Expected Cost
is greatly reduced to $24,285 and the variance has been reduced to 5.02 for a reduction of about
77.19%. And all of this has been achieved by using relatively low proportions of induced learning
capacity. Quite simply, as one would expect, the results of this empirical study suggest that, from
a quality improvement and production cost perspective, it is clearly beneficial to design effective
induced learning programs.

2.5.6

Brief Discussion

For this problem, the results of the empirical sensitivity analysis show that for relatively more
complex production processes, our model suggests that progress along the learning curve is best
achieved through continuous production and concurrent effective induced learning activities.

These results also suggest that accounting for forgetting phenomenon in learning models
intensifies and underscores the need to counter the impact of under-capacity production and
concurrent forgetting through investments in the development and implementation of effective
induced learning activities. During planned production interruptions, the development of effective
induced learning programs, through a prudent and thoughtful combination of conceptual and
operational learning, can introduce analytical procedures and experiential activities, such as the
thoughtful collection of relevant process data for the assessment of cause-effect relationships for
understanding and implementing process improvements. Thereby, under-capacity production can
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open up, during such downtimes of process operation, opportunities for new knowledge, which
was also suggested by Zellmer-Bruhn (2003).

2.6

Summary of this Chapter

The primary contribution of this Chapter is a quality-based learning-forgetting model, which will
enhance manufacturer’s effectiveness in its supplier development efforts. The model allows for a
continual assessment and update on the parameters in the model, which is especially desirable in
a dynamic production environment. And our comprehensive view of supplier processes in light of
under-capacity production, including disruptions, and thereby knowledge depreciation provides,
for the manufacturer, a more informed allocation of quality improvement targets among suppliers.

This model distinguishes itself from other learning-forgetting models foremost in how we
incorporate knowledge depreciation. Past literature treats knowledge depreciation almost as the
synonym of forgetting in autonomous learning, which is typically viewed as a result of production
disruptions. We associated forgetting with under-capacity production in general, which can be
caused by factors other than disruptions. Furthermore, we proposed that a second dimension of
knowledge depreciation should also be taken into consideration. This is called knowledge decay
due to under-capacity induced learning, which may include the discontinuation or insufficiency of
induced learning activities/investments. Thus, we not only partition knowledge accumulation into
autonomous and induced learning, but also correspondingly partition knowledge depreciation into
forgetting and knowledge decay. Further, we imbed knowledge depreciation directly into the
progression model components, such that accumulated knowledge is directly reduced in the
presence of forgetting and knowledge decay.

Our results show that knowledge depreciation is a detriment to quality improvement and the
oblivion of which leads to overestimation of variance improvement and a suboptimal system
quality cost. Therefore, by also accounting for both forgetting and knowledge decay, the optimum
investment strategy necessarily requires additional investment in induced learning. Further, since
the presence of knowledge decay weakens the counteractive effect of induced learning on process
disruption, quality improvement targets should account for this and be adjusted accordingly.
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Our model assumes perfect information exchange between manufacturer and supplier.
Nevertheless, asymmetric information structures often exist in supply chains and requires
consideration for coordination and contracting. Despite the prevalence of research efforts
regarding asymmetric information in other contexts (i.e., inventory problems), similar research is
scarce in the context of manufacturer and suppliers’ coordination regarding quality-based learning
(Kim 2000) and provides a topic for future research. Another potential area of future research
would be to investigate, following the realization of the achieved variance reductions, how a
manufacturer updates the induced learning rates. One potential approach would be via a Bayesian
updating model, which may be similar to that used in Tomlin (2009). Additionally, it may be useful
to investigate the effect of interactions among supplier processes, which will result in a more
complicated quality cost model for the manufacturer (Plante 2000). Lastly, managerial insights
could also be drawn when the learning-forgetting model is constructed in a dynamic planning
framework. While production is assumed to be predetermined in this Chapter, it will be interesting
to explore, in the presence of knowledge depreciation and limited resources, the optimal paths of
both production and induced learning investment over a planning horizon (Dorroh et al. 1994).
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A COMPREHENSIVE LEARNING MODEL FOR
DETERMINING OPTIMAL INVESTMENTS IN A DYADIC SUPPLY
CHAIN

We explore the optimal annually contracted investment strategy in quality improvement efforts
within a centralized dyadic supply chain, in which a manufacturer outsources product components
to several suppliers. The assembled product quality depends not only on the individual main effects
of each supplier’s planned investments but also on the often ignored, yet ever present collective
interactive effects among the suppliers. Taking and advocating a system coordination approach, in
lieu of those models having objectives that focus on maximizing the benefits net costs of either the
manufacturer or the supplier, we develop, within a dyadic supply chain, a system coordinating
model to assess quality improvement targeted investments that are annually contracted throughout
the supply chain. Further, it has been well established that there exists a strong and positive causal
relationship between continuous learning and continuous process improvement. More succinctly,
neglect investments in learning and quality falters. This relationship is consistent with the notion
that reducing variance not only improves quality but also reduces costs, increases productivity and,
not by accident, these phenomena are also well mirrored and reflected by the learning curve.
Management has realized and reaped the rewards of a sustained emphasis, commitment and
continued investment in learning activities, many of which have been targeted towards training in
variance reduction concepts and methods (i.e., Six Sigma and the like). Relatively recent research
has adopted the increasing evidence that during process interruption, forgetting occurs which has
been observed in the data and learning curves emerging from this research. Even more recently,
this research has suggested that the forgetting phenomena occurring during process interruption is
typically under-estimated. In addition, who would have thought, forgetting occurs even during
continuous, non-interrupted process operation. In this research, we propose a system model for the
annually contracted allocation of quality improvement targets, achieved via variance reduction that
(1) accounts for interactive effects among suppliers, (2) uses the learning curve to model the effect
of variance reduction achieved through learning by doing, autonomous learning and/or that
achieved by managerial investments in induced learning, (3) accounts for forgetting under process
interruption, where both the occurrence and the length of an interruption are modeled as
exponentially distributed random variables and (4) reflecting relatively recent research that has
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provided evidence of the occurrence of forgetting even during process operation, where we
introduce a novel technique, having the plausible assumption that both production capacity and
training capacity are known.

3.1

Background & Theoretical Support

The quality of a product is one of the most important factors affecting its competitiveness,
prompting manufacturers continuously to strive to improve and update their quality management
processes. Manufacturers can reduce cost and can focus on core competencies such as product
design and marketing by outsourcing its components to external/internal suppliers (Bolandifar et
al. 2016). As more and more product components are outsourced to various suppliers, there is an
increasing recognition and a renewed emphasis on understanding the impact of the quality for
supplier sourced component processes on the end product quality (Gray et al. 2009, Chao et al.
2009).

Through the compounding effect of transmitted variation, supplier sourced components influence
through the filter of functional relationships, the variance experienced by the manufacture and,
ultimately, the customer. Thus, it is important for members of the supply chain to be aware of this
compounding effect of transmitted variation up through the coordinated supply chain where
reductions in variance result in experiencing variance reductions at all other downstream members
of the supply chain even if they have not invested in quality improvement efforts. Hence, it is a
very important concept to consider when deciding on the allocation of quality improvement efforts
along the supply chain.

The Dyadic supply chain model of the coordinated chain provides for the one-on-one incentive
contract negotiations used to align the self-interests of a member of the supply chain with the other
members. These negotiations are essentially bilateral games with bargaining where the
manufacturer and supplier enter into an incentive contract voluntarily because both benefit from
cooperation (Zusman and Etgar 1981). The supplier has an estimate of his expected profit,
independent of the supply chain, including plans to invest in quality improvement resulting in a
reduction of his quality cost. Hence, the supplier already has in hand a predetermined reservation
profit which any incentive contract must exceed to obtain the participation and the trust to share
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information openly. Supplier quality heavily influences the end product quality, hence the
supplier’s independent decision may not be enough for manufacture. The manufacture has to
present incentives that are designed to sustain the cooperation of the supplier throughout the term
of the contract (Tarakci et al., 2006; Alexander, Li and Plante, 2017). Usually, the manufacturer
will present an incentive contract to a supplier with a range of tradeoff values for adjusting two of
the contract terms. The resulting range has been predetermined by the manufacturer to provide at
least the reservation profit of the supplier while the manufacturer reaps all of the additional profit
from the coordinated supply chain. Normally, it is feasible to design incentive contracts by
considering the supply chain as an integrated manufacturing system that facilitates monitoring and
coordinating the improvement of supplier quality (Bernstein and Kok 2009, Ha 2016, Dong et al.
2016). Through the compounding effect of transmitted variation, improving end product quality is
essentially the same as improving supplier’s quality, since the end product quality heavily depends
on both the functional relationships with a single supplier (components with low interdependency)
as well as the interaction effects (component with high interdependency) among several suppliers
(Agrawal et al. 2017; Baiman et al. 2001; Plante, ???). Under incentives contracts of a coordinated
manufacturing system, Texas Instruments and Chrysler both invest in their suppliers’ training
programs (Trommer 1996); Intel invites suppliers to participate in its quality improvement
program (Roos 2001); Techtronic Industries (TTI) forms and sends quality teams to assist its
suppliers for training in quality improvement (Zhu et al. 2007).

While the manufacturer and suppliers need to improve the product quality by improving various
indices used to describe quality such as process capability measures, including Six Sigma, reducing
the variance of a product’s quality characteristics is one of the most well-known and useful paths.
Its connection to product cost (Taguchi 1986) and process capability (i.e., Six Sigma) have been
well established. Further, quality improvement, via variance reduction, can be achieved by
learning and amassing what has been learned into a growing body of knowledge. Indeed,
continuous quality improvement in production processes occurs via knowledge accumulation in
environments conducive to continuous learning, (i.e., Baily and Farrell 2006). Generally, learning
contains two types: autonomous learning (Netland and Ferdows 2016, Egelman et al. 2017) and
induced learning (Li and Rajagopalan 1998, Plante 2000, Wang et al. 2013). Autonomous learning
is a by-product from repeating working and it is called ‘Learning-by-doing’. As long as production

33
activities occur, knowledge accumulates along with it. This type of learning normally incurs little
additional investment. Induced learning, on the other hand, emerges from targeted managerial
interventions and investments, such as training and engineering activities devoted to operational
training in the techniques used to reduce variance. Since both learning mechanisms stimulate
variance reduction, it is important to account for both of their contributions in any model of quality
improvement in a manner that provides for the separate estimation of their effects. In this regard,
we adopt the production function of Wang et al. (2013).

While knowledge accumulates with learning, knowledge also deteriorates in the absence of
learning. Several studies have reported that during process disruptions, not only has knowledge
accumulation, through autonomous learning, is paused, but that the body of knowledge decreases
due to a forgetting phenomena (Jaber and Bonney 2003, Froehle and White 2014). Moreover,
Agrawal and Muthulingam (2015) found that more than 16% of quality improvement gains from
autonomous learning and 13% of gains attributed to induced learning activities depreciate every
year. Evidence shows that companies have lost millions of dollars by involuntary loss of
knowledge (Holan et al. 2004). Indeed, researchers (i.e., Argote and Epple 1990) believe that
forgetting is always present and Wang et al. (2018) have suggested that under-capacity production
and underutilized investments in induced learning activities lead to the deterioration of the amassed
body of knowledge. Such deterioration incurs increased variance, decreased process capability and
increased product cost. Many existing learning curves such as Wang et al. (2013) are limited in
this respect. Hence, in order to consider knowledge depreciation as well, a comprehensive learning
curve allowing knowledge depreciation (forgetting) is introduced. Besides learning, the
comprehensive learning curve captures the knowledge depreciation and the impact due to random
production interruptions. Generally, knowledge depreciation can be effectively countered by
additional investment in induced learning, especially those forgetting events arising from
production interruptions in suppliers’ production processes (Wang et al. 2013).

Product architecture affects quality (Anderson et al. 2000) as well. Product architectures can be
separable or non-separable. Separable architecture means product failure can be traced to a
particular component, and non-separable architecture means it cannot be traced to a particular
component (Baiman et al. 2001). In other words, components interaction is also a key factor to
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control product quality. Further, Novak and Eppinger (2001) used vehicle front-wheel-drive and
rear-wheel-drive examples showing how components interact with each other. More importantly,
Novak and Eppinger (2001) pointed out, sometimes, any change of one component requires
additional coordination with all the interactive components. Thus, the more interconnected are the
components in a system, the more complex coordination becomes.

In this Chapter, we consider that components producing processes are independent and
uncorrelated with each other but they can interact to affect the performance measures of the end
product. According to Plante (2000), it is plausible by using a quadratic form to measure the
components interaction. We assume the end product quality totally depends on supplier
components. The quality is measured by several performances, so each performance is directly
connected to components. Here, the two way interactive effects are expected to efficiently describe
other higher order interaction effects. We incorporate the comprehensive learning curve to model
suppliers’ autonomous and induced learning, respective knowledge depreciation (Darr et al. 1995)
and production interruption. Suppliers can invest in induced learning in order to reduce the
components quality cost, and thereby the end product quality cost. These investments in induced
learning occur in a dyadic supply chain. We develop a model to determine the optimal induced
learning for suppliers and the manufacturing system respectively. Generally, optimal induced
learning is larger under an integrated manufacturing system. The manufacture can be better off if
they incent the supplier to invest more in induced learning.

The Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we bring comprehensive learning curve into our
model, and connect end product quality with suppliers components. We then compare the optimal
induced learning amount under suppliers’ independent decision and under an integrated
manufacturing system. Thus, we provide a range for incentive from manufacture to its suppliers.
In Section 3, we provide an example to demonstrate the implementation of our model. In addition,
we consider the sensitivity of the optimal solution to changes in several factors in the model.
Section 4 extends the model to a more general case. Lastly, Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
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3.2

Basic Model Formulation

We consider a manufacturer who produce a fixed amount of product, gt , for the current production
period t. There are M manufacture performance measures that are critical to the quality of the
product and each of these are influenced by N components outsourced to N independent suppliers.
Similar to Plante (2000), we assume that each performance measure depends on the components
measures of the suppliers. Specifically, albeit the random error, we assume that the functional
relationship between the performance measures and components measures can be well
approximated by the following quadratic equation:
N

N −1

Yk =
c0( k ) + ∑ ci( k ) X i + ∑
i= 1

N

∑c

i = 1 j = i +1

(k )
ij

X i X j , k = 1, …, M ,

(1)
where
Yk

= The k-th manufacturer performance measure,

Xi

= The i-th supplier component measure,

c0( k )

= The intercept term for the k-th performance measure (i.e., fixed effect),

ci( k )

= The main effect of the i-th component on the k-th performance measure,

cij( k )

= The interaction effect of the i-th and j-th components on the k-th performance
measure.

Note: For ease of notation, k will index the manufacture performance measures, and i, j
will index the suppliers component measures for the rest of this Chapter.

The component measures are designed to the desired levels during the experiments. Central
Composite Designs (CCD) are typically used to estimate coefficients of the quadratic equations
for each of the performance measures. To facilitate the development and analysis of our model we
use the standardized component measures instead of the original component measures. From (1),
we have:
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N −1

N

Yk =c0( k ) + ∑ ci( k ) ( µi + σ i zi ) + ∑
i= 1

N

∑c

i = 1 j = i +1

( µi + σ i zi )( µ j + σ j z j )

N
N −1 N
(k )
(k )
(k )
ij
i j
i
i i
ij
i j
1
1 j=
1
1 j=
i=
i=
i +1
i=
i=
i +1
N

N −1

(k )
ij

         = c0( k ) + ∑ ci( k ) µi + ∑
N −1

  + ∑
                               

N

∑c

N

∑c

i = 1 j = i +1

µ µ + ∑ c σ z + ∑ ∑ c ( µ σ z j +µ jσ i zi )

σ iσ j zi z j .

(k )
ij

where
=

zi

X i − µi

σi

, i = 1,..., N , is the i-th standardized component measures

(independently follow standard normal distribution),

µi

=

σi

= The standard deviation of the i-th component.

The mean of the i-th component,

Generally, component measures (variances of X i ’s) improve from period to period during
production due to autonomous learning or learning-by-doing. We assume all production
information from the previous periods (e.g., previous variances) is available from/for both the
manufacturer as well as suppliers. Moreover, in the design process, a manufacturer coordinates all
suppliers so that the expected value of each performance measure achieves their intended targets
( τ k and τ i ). We start our analysis from previous period (t-1) for performance measure k, such that,
N −1

N

Yk ,t −1 = τ k + ∑ ci( k )σ i ,t −1 zi + ∑

N

∑

N −1

cij( k ) ( µiσ j ,t −1 z j +µ jσ i ,t −1 zi ) + ∑

N

∑c

σ

σ

(k )
ij
i ,t −1 j ,t −1 i j
1
1 j=
1 j=
i=
i=
i +1
i=
i +1

zz .

where

σ i ,t −1

= The standard deviation of the i-th component by the end of production period
t-1,

We could further rewrite Yk ,t −1 as:
N

N −1

Yk ,t −1 =
τ k + ∑ ai(,kt −)1 zi + ∑
i= 1

where

N

∑a

i = 1 j = i +1

(k )
ij ,t −1 i

z z j , k = 1, …, M

(2)
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N −1

N

c0( k ) + ∑ ci( k )τ i + ∑

τk

=

ai(,kt −)1

=

ci( k )σ i ,t −1 + ∑

aij( k,t)−1

=

cij( k )σ i ,t −1σ j ,t −1

i= 1

N

∑c

i = 1 j = i +1

N −1

N

ττj ,

(k )
ij
i

i
(k )
(k )
ij
j i ,t −1
ji
j i ,t −1
1 j=
1
i=
i +1
j=

∑c

µσ

+ ∑c µ σ

With the standardized form, we can separate the parameters into two parts, one is uncorrelated
with time and the other is related with time. The manufacturer controls the end product quality by
controlling the time related parameters in (2), which totally depends on its supplier components.
Hence, the manufacturer leans toward having all suppliers improve their quality as much as
possible to increase end product quality. At the same time, the suppliers lean towards lowering
their quality cost to get the maximum profit. Both can benefit from the reduction in variance.

3.2.1

Quality, Expected Cost and Variance

Since the late 1970’s, it has been commonly accepted that the inherent variance in manufacturing
largely determines the level of quality and/or capability of a process (e.g., Six Sigma). According
to Taguchi (1986), the following function can well approximate expected quality costs by the
corresponding process variance:
C= k (σ 2 + ( µ − τ ) 2 )= kσ 2

(3)

where C is the product quality cost, which is directly linked to product variance ( σ 2 ) and bias
( µ − τ ) 2 by a positive parameter k. Without loss of generality, we assume that the expected value

of each performance measure equals its corresponding design target. Thus, the expected quality
cost only depends on the variance. Clearly, this relationship captures the ubiquitously accepted
notion that improving quality via variance reduction, both reduces cost as well as increases
customer perceived quality.
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3.2.2

Suppliers Learning and Variance

Managerial intervention through intentional investments in operational learning activities that are
targeted to reducing variation in processes is called induced learning. Induced learning activities
are deliberatively selected, developed and designed to accelerate the accumulation of knowledge
via the traditional method of knowledge accumulation that is reflected in the often studied learning
curve of a company. Learning curves have become ubiquitous in unambiguously displaying the
proclivity of a company to effectively and efficiently absorb and learn how various factors affect
the productivity, cost and quality of their processes. This sounds eerily familiar to the always
present refrain of the list of production outcomes that are correlated with and derived from every
known implementation of those activities that were learned through targeted continuous
operational training, those activities devoted to variance reduction. It is our belief that the learning
curve is a precise reflection of the cost of variation as described by Taguchi (1986), which, as we
know, is the measure of customer perceived quality. It must follow that the progress function used
to model a learning curve must also be used to model the changes in cost of the Taguchi (1986)
cost function as knowledge accumulates. Thus, quality cost will be modeled via a convex progress
function decreasing at a marginally decreasing rate as knowledge accumulates. The implications
are enormous, especially when one imagines or brings to bear the large body of research devoted
to the learning curve that can now be directed to the unquestioned causal force that begets the
learning curve of a company. We now have a metric that goes beyond just estimating the marginal
production costs, rather it is now clear that it also represents and reveals improvements in customer
perceived quality and reveals that the underlying cause is variance reduction. Of even greater
importance, having its own sizable set of implications, is that knowledge accumulation is the
undeniable sole contributing force behind variance reduction. This knowledge is rapidly becoming
the most important currency of a company, establishing its value in the market place and especially
its value within a coordinated supply chain that through the trust of its members thrives on the
freely available and open to other members of the supply chain information housed within its
knowledge base and communicated in real time to other members. To survive on today’s field of
competition, especially in today’s environment facing the realities of “Big Data” supply chains
have to react in real time and accurately through the use of recommender systems to assist
customers through the ever-growing plethora of products available to them. The information
database used to build the knowledge of the supply chain is, due to social networks, online behavior
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of customers, and so on are increasing in Volume (the number of rows or observations in the
database) and in Variety (he number of columns/variables/products in the database), and arriving
at an increasing Velocity and questionable Voracity, the underlying vehicle for mining this data is
the removal of noise to separate the true information from the chaff, where inevitably variance
reduction will be of utmost importance. Hence, investments in induced learning activities that are
targeted to building and improving the capability of a company to reach a greater level of learned
knowledge, say through the use of techniques such as the design and analysis of central composite
designs, allowing an analyst the ability to build on prior knowledge by augmenting the knowledge
base with response surface designs having the analytical ability to estimate quadratic and even
cubic functional relationships.

In addition to accelerating a company along the learning curve, induced learning is effective as a
means to counteract forgetting due to process disruptions (Wang et. al., 2013). To model the effects
of ubiquitous forgetting in supplier operations, Wang, et. al., (2018) used an approach implied by
Nembhard (2001), who used the slack in the capacity of a process to estimate the parameters of a
“forgetting curve”, which is the ever-present counter-point to the “learning curve”. Further, as
suggested by Wang, et.al. (2018), the company’s resulting body of amassed knowledge is
vulnerable to loss when the designed capacity for production and/or the designed capacity of
induced learning (measured in units of training) are not meant. The implications of this is clear in
that forgetting is ever present, not only during random process disruptions (where the occurrence
of a process disruption is modeled by a probability distribution having an increasing hazard rate)
and planned disruptions of production process disruption, such as regularly scheduled process
maintenance. Thus, it is advisable that a model for learning should consider both learning activities
that augment a company’s knowledge and forgetting events that deteriorate that knowledge.
Combining both sources of knowledge accumulation, the effect on the process variance ( σ i2,t ) of
supplier component i (i = 1,…,N) at the end of planning period t is represented by the following
progress function (Comprehensive Learning Curve):

σ i2,t =
σ i2,0Gi ,t − λ Li ,t − λ =
σ i2,0 (α i Gi ,t −1 + di ,t gi ,t )
A ,i

I ,i

− λ A ,i

(β L
i

i ,t −1

+ li ,t )

− λI ,i

(4)

where i in subscript stands for supplier i and the definition for each notation having the following
definition,
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Gi ,t

= The accumulated autonomous learning knowledge at the end of period t,

αi

=

d i ,t

= The production interruption for the planned production during period t,

g i ,t

= The accumulated knowledge due to planned production during period t,

Li ,t

= The accumulated knowledge due to induced learning at the end of period t,

βi

= The proportion of sustainable induced learning knowledge from previous,

li ,t

= The amount of induced learning activities to be determined for period t,

λ A ,i

= The autonomous learning parameter,

λI , i

= The induced learning parameter.

The proportion of sustainable autonomous learning knowledge from previous,

Equation (4) fully captures the reduction in variance achieved through both autonomous and
induced learning and the forgetting that occurs for under capacity training and production. been
lost in one period. The traditional learning curve has α i =1 ( βi =1).

3.2.3

Production Interruptions

The Wang et. al. (2013) model for disruptions in supplier processes captured the relationship
between forgetting that is known to occur during planned suspensions of process operations (i.e.,
unavoidable planned disruptions of process operations typically are required during regularly
scheduled process maintenance, Tarakci (2006)). The strong relationship between knowledge
creation and variance reduction dictate that the deterioration of knowledge must be modeled as
an increase in process variance with a corresponding increase in cost and customer perceived
decrease in quality. Induced learning has been proposed as one means for counteracting the effect
of forgetting during process disruption. For example, during planned suspension of production, it
would be clearly advisable to take advantage of these planned process downtimes, where all
process operators are available to participate in operational training exercises that have been
designed and organized to achieve learning objectives which have been previously formed by both
managers and process operators based on their current training progress or level understanding of
variance reduction methodologies. These training exercises should be explicitly created to provide
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operational training for specific variance reduction problems where the amount, type and level of
training is, in part, determined via the cost minimizing tradeoff between the cost associated with
the training exercises/studies and the realized reduction in variance due to process disruption.

We will denote the proportional amount of the knowledge base lost due to process disruption as
di ,t , 0 ≤ di ,t ≤ 1 and, accounting for the occurrence and length of the disruption, we choose to

model a disruption as a power function, such that,

di ,t = n −θ , θ > 0
n

= The number of interruptions, and represents,

θ

= The interruption effect scale parameter.

Finally, not all process disruptions are planned. Some of the more damaging process disruptions
to the knowledge base can occur unpredictably in both length and cost to bring production back
on line, such as disruptions due to the power, severity and unsparing whims of Mother Nature (i.e.,
Tornadoes, Hurricanes, Earthquakes, Volcanic Eruptions, etc.) as well as the less damaging and
less costly to repair, yet still unpredictable disruptions that, combined with the uncertainty of
demand facing supply chains, inexorably cause major catastrophic upheavals to the best laid plans
of supply chain managers. Threatening an undoing of the incentive contracts that have aligned the
self-interest of individual supply chain members with the whole. Threatening the continuation of
the hard-earned trust throughout the supply chain. Trust forms then very fabric of the coordinated
supply chain. Trust provides the nourishment necessary for sustaining and maintaining the willing
cooperation of all members to freely share their most privately held knowledge, acquired via the
intellectual talent of its staff, resulting in unique competitive advantages. The coordinated supply
chain relies on the trust to open this information to the communication architecture of the supply
chain, making it a part of the supply chain’s knowledge base that is available in real time to all
members of the supply chain. Thereby forming the knowledge base of the supply chain, which in
today’s competitive environment is the very currency or storehouse of wealth of the coordinated
supply chain.
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Hence, it is important to include the unpredictability of process disruptions in our model. Tarakci,
et.al., (2006) suggested that the Weibull probability distribution would be appropriate for modeling
the occurrence of unplanned process disruptions, as follows,
f (t ) = kwt w−1

where w ≥ 2 is the shape parameter, and k > 0 is the scale parameter. Using this model, the
expected number of breakdowns in the time interval [0, gi ,t ] , is:
w
=
n kt=
kgi ,t w .

As a result, the expected interruption influence is:

di ,t = (kgi ,t w ) −θ
Finally, the progress function model of variance can be stated as,

σ i2,t =
σ i2,0Gi ,t − λ Li ,t − λ =+
σ i2,0 (α i Gi ,t −1 (kgi ,t w ) −θ gi ,t )
A ,i

I ,i

− λ A ,i

(β L
i

i ,t −1

+ li ,t )

− λI ,i

(5)

Depending on the capacity of induced learning activities available, we can use this model to assist
in the planning of additional induced learning activities to counter the knowledge depreciation due
to unplanned process disruptions. Another way to assist in handling both planned and unplanned
process disruptions is to outsource regular maintenance and repair responsibilities to a contractor
who is offered an incentive contract to become part of the supply chain. The parameters that are
used to design these incentive contracts, including the expected cost and expected time to perform
regular preventive maintenance and the expected cost and expected time to repair unplanned
breakdowns in production were suggested by Tarakci et. al., (2006). Further, the extent to which
an incentive contract has the ability to sustain supply chain coordination over the term of the
contract is important to maintain the trust of the supply chain membership (Alexander, Li and
Plante, (2017)).

3.2.4

Improvement in Component and Performance Variances

Using (5), the model for the change in variance from period t-1 and period t, the reduction and/or
increase in variance is straightforward and can be stated as,
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σ i2,t  α i Gi ,t −1 + (kgi ,t w ) −θ gi ,t 
=

σ i2,t −1 
Gi ,t −1


− λ A ,i

 βi Li ,t −1 + li ,t 


 Li ,t −1 

− λI ,i

,

(6)

where,
g i ,t

= The forecasted demand and therefore the production planned for period t,

Gi ,t −1

= The accumulated production at the end of period t-1, measuring the net
contribution of variance reduction achieved via autonomous learning combined
with the variance increasing events or forgetting, due to an achieved production
level that is less than the design capacity of the production process,

Li ,t −1

= The accumulated number of training units in period t-1 of an overall training
program that provide to a company a structure to the specially designed
programs akin to the degree programs that are designed by qualified faculty
who are responsible for deciding on the body of knowledge that must be
mastered. A training unit is envisioned to be equivalent to a typical university
section where the complexity of the subject matter determines the enrollment
cap for each section. And the number of sections is limited by the number of
qualified instructors available to guide students.

li ,t is a decision variable to be determined for i-th supplier such that

σ i2,t

σ i2,t −1

< 1 . Then, the

proportionate reduction in the variance and expected cost of the i-th component for period t is

(σ

2
i ,t −1

− σ i2,t )

σ i2,t −1

.

(7)
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Note: In order to consider some extreme cases (e.g. 100% forgetting or knowledge decay), we will
allow the constraint

σ i2,t

σ i2,t −1

≤ 1 to be violated in our empirical analysis in Section 4. Further,

using (2), the variance of the k-th performance measure for period t-1 Yk ,t −1 can be stated as follows
(see Appendix-A-5 for proof).
=
σ k2,t −1

N −1

N

∑ (ai(,kt −)1 )2 + ∑
i= 1

N

∑ (a

i = 1 j = i +1

(k )
2
ij ,t −1

) .

(8)

Similarly, we have
=
σ k2,t

N −1

N

∑ (ai(,kt ) )2 + ∑
i= 1

N

∑ (a

i = 1 j = i +1

(k ) 2
ij ,t

) .

Then, using (6) and (8), the updated variance of the k-th performance measure is,
=
σ k2,t

 σ i2,t  N −1 N
 σ i2,t   σ 2j ,t 
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+
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(
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∑
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− λ A ,i
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 βi Li ,t −1 + li ,t 


 Li ,t −1 

 β j L j ,t −1 + l j ,t 


L j ,t −1



(9)

− λI ,i

×

− λI , j

.

Using (8) and (9), for a given investment in induced learning, the proportionate reduction in
variance and hence the corresponding expected cost for the k-th performance measure is then,

(σ

2
k ,t −1

− σ k2,t )

σ k2,t −1

.

(10)

The metrics in (7) and (10) will be used to access our result in the empirical analysis in Section
3.3.
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3.2.5

Suppliers Decision

Independent of the manufacturer, the investment in or the induced learning cost of supplier i can
reasonably be approximated by hi (li ,t ) 2 , where hi is a quadratic parameter (Moskowitz et al. 2001).

Ci kiσ i2,t + hi (li ,t ) 2 . σ i2,t , a decreasing function
Hence, the total quality cost of the Supplier i is=
with respect to the level of induced learning, and is convex with respect to li ,t . Hence, obtaining
the derivative of Ci with respect to li ,t , setting it equal to zero, provides supplier i with the cost
minimizing induced learning of lis,t and in terms of incentive contracts for coordinated supply
chains, the reservation quality cost Cis . Any cost higher than Cis is not acceptable by supplier i.
M

Under this choice, the manufacture has the quality cost CMs = ∑ K kσ k2,t . The total system (supply
k =1

s
=
chain) quality cost is TEC
t

3.2.6

N

∑C
i =1

s
i

+ CMs .

Minimum Quality Cost for Coordinated System

Although the supplier has his own optimal induced learning amount, and the reservation cost. It,
generally, will not be optimal for the supply chain. The Total Expected Cost (TEC) of the system
chain consists of the supplier’s quality cost combined with the manufacturer’s quality cost. The
trade-off between the investments in induced learning activities and the resulting reduction in
quality costs realized by these investments can be stated as follows,

TECt =

N

∑ Ci + CM =

N

M

∑ (kiσ i2,t + hili2,t ) + ∑ K kσ k2,t .

=i 1 =i 1

(10)

=
k 1

And TECt is a function of li ,t for i=1,…,N. In order to find the optimal induced learning amount
for the coordinated system, we need the following Lemma.
Lemma: σ k2,t is convex with respect to the induced learning amount li ,t . (Proof in Appendix-A-6)

46
From the Lemma, we know that TECt is a convex function with respect to the induced learning
amount, since it is sum of several convex functions. Hence, there exists a global optimal induced
learning amount ( li*,t for all i) for each supplier. Consequently, although a closed-form solution for
induced learning is not available, a univariate numerical search procedure can be used to find the
optimal solution. The increase in induced learning will bring the supplier’s variance down, then,
via transmitted variation, the end product performance variance is thereby reduced, or
∂σ k2,t

N

∂li ,t

< 0 . Then we have ∑

∂Ci

M

∂l

+ ∑ Kk

∂σ k2,t

s
i ,t
=i 1 =
k 1

∂lis,t

< 0 . Thus, the suppliers’ independent

optimal induced learning is not enough for the coordinated system ( li*,t > lis,t ). Under the optimal
policy, the total cost of the supply chain is less than that achived by thye suppliers’ actin g
independently, such that TECt* < TECts , but this, of course, places a greater investment by the
suppliers, having a higher quality cost Ci* > Cis .. The reduction in costs via variance education for
the manufacturer is,
N

N

N

N

∆CM = CMs − CM* = (TECts − ∑ Cis ) − (TECt* − ∑ Ci* ) = TECts − TECt* + (∑ Ci* − ∑ Cis )
=i 1

=i 1

=i 1 =i 1

Although we have shown that coordination results in a lower expected quality cost, questions arise
regarding how to develop a mechanism that ensure a cooperative setting and how to allocate the
extra saving generated from coordination.

3.3

Numerical Analysis

The purposes of this section are (1) to demonstrate an implementation of our model; (2) to compare
the suppliers’ decisions under dyadic supply chain and coordinated system. To demonstrate an
implementation of our model, we use the multivariate data set from Derringer and Suich (1980).
In this scenario, we have a manufacturer who assembles a product from three components, where
each component is provided by a different and independent supplier. Each product has four
performance measures, which are influenced by the components. A central composite
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experimental design is used to collect data. The data was used to estimate the parameters of the
interactive model, representing the relationship between performance and component measures.

These resulting interactive models are:
Y1 =
133.1 − 13.82 X 1 − 14.98 X 2 − 9.14 X 3 + 3.60 X 1 X 2 + 5.00 X 1 X 3 + 5.53 X 2 X 3 , R 2 = 94%

Y2 =
1255 + 224.63 X 1 + 206.50 X 2 + 116.83 X 3 + 48.69 X 1 X 2 + 66.06 X 1 X 3 + 73.26 X 2 X 3 , R 2 = 53%
Y3 =
417.5 − 83.49 X 1 − 26.30 X 2 − 61.92 X 3 + 6.14 X 1 X 2 + 4.39 X 1 X 3 + 0.88 X 2 X 3 , R 2 = 96%
Y4 =69.78 − 1.18 X 1 + 3.62 X 2 + 1.37 X 3 − 1.14 X 1 X 2 + 0.09 X 1 X 3 − 0.18 X 2 X 3 , R 2 = 87%

Note: R 2 = SSR
is the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is predictable
SST
from the independent variable(s).
Table 2 Parameter Setting
𝑔𝑔1,𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝛼1
𝐺𝐺1 (𝑡𝑡 − 1)
𝜆𝜆1,𝐴𝐴
𝜎𝜎12
𝑘𝑘1
𝛽𝛽1
𝜆𝜆1,𝐼𝐼
𝐿𝐿1 (𝑡𝑡 − 1)
ℎ1

3
0.9
6
0.1262
10
1000
0.95
0.33070
12
50
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3,4

𝑔𝑔2,𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝛼2
𝐺𝐺2 (𝑡𝑡 − 1)
𝜆𝜆2,𝐴𝐴
𝜎𝜎22
𝑘𝑘2
𝛽𝛽2
𝜆𝜆2,𝐼𝐼
𝐿𝐿2 (𝑡𝑡 − 1)
ℎ2

3
0.9
6
0.1262
15
1000
0.95
0.33070
12
50

𝑔𝑔2,𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝛼3
𝐺𝐺3 (𝑡𝑡 − 1)
𝜆𝜆3,𝐴𝐴
𝜎𝜎32
𝑘𝑘3
𝛽𝛽3
𝜆𝜆3,𝐼𝐼
𝐿𝐿3 (𝑡𝑡 − 1)
ℎ3
1

3
0.9
6
0.1262
20
1000
0.95
0.33070
12
50

Table 2 consists of all the parameters settings. The knowledge-depreciating setting are 0.9 for all
forgetting and 0.95 for all knowledge decay. Under the normal situation, we believe 5%-10% of
the previous knowledge will be lost from previous process. This proportion of lost is unavoidable.
There are many reasons leads to the lost, e.g. well-trained worker leaving; new employee come to
the production line; production process minor adjustment; material replacement; new technology
introduced. In order to compare the difference when system with or without coordination, we have
table 3 and table 4 below.
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Table 3 Dyadic System
Optimal Solution
% Reduction in variance

Induced Learning
% Reduction in variance
Supplier’ Quality Cost
Total supplier’s Quality Cost
Total Cost

Manufacture Performance Measures
1
2
3
4
16
16
10
13
Component Performance Measures
1
2
3
2.23
3.08
3.84
8
10
11
9437.6
13984.74
18449
41871.34
Dyadic Supply Chain
3780849.36

Table 4 Coordinated System
Optimal Solution
% Reduction in variance

Induced Learning
% Reduction in variance
Supplier’ Quality Cost
Total supplier’s Quality Cost
Total Cost

Manufacture Performance Measures
1
2
3
4
61
60
45
55
Component Performance Measures
1
2
3
44.00
51.61
51.64
42
45
45
102600.90
141469.17
144417.63
388487.7
Coordinated System
2173149.66

The optimal induced learning amount exist under both situations. In addition, without any induced
learning, the supplier has to pay 43867.00 as quality cost and the whole system has to pay
4307304.81 for quality. From table 3 and 4 we know that right choice of investment in induced
learning can save the quality cost a lot. While suppliers make decision on their own behalf, they
want to save as much as possible. A little extra induced learning than optima is unacceptable, even
this increased induced learning can save a lot for the whole system. On the other hand, each
supplier need to pay almost 10 times quality cost than dyadic supply chain under the coordinated
system in our model. The total suppliers’ quality cost 8 times more. This extra quality cost is
directly contributed by the increased induced leaning amount, which helps the whole system
especially the manufacturer save a huge quality cost. Actually, the total saved cost is much more
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than the extra suppliers’ quality cost. To be the greatest beneficiary, as long as the manufacture
give enough incentives to his suppliers to make sure all suppliers paying less than their dyadic
supply chain quality cost, he can make the whole plan go smooth.

In addition, we can see the compound effect for suppliers’ variance reduction. In the dyadic supply
chain, since the parameters for suppliers are symmetric expect the initial variance, supplier with
higher variance (supplier 3) is willing to invest more in induced learning than supplier with lower
variance (supplier 1) while they consider their own interest only. In contrast, considering the
compound variance reduction from suppliers, the coordinated system make supplier 2 and supplier
3 have the same level of induced learning.

3.4

Summary of this Chapter

In this section, we propose a comprehensive learning model to consider the quality cost of the
manufacturer and the suppliers via product variance, where the manufacturer assemble s an end
product from suppliers’ components. The components interact on the product performance, hence
end product variance depend on components variance.

The comprehensive model assumes that both autonomous learning and induced learning could
reduce the process variance while interruption could increase it. To account for forgetting during
process disruption, we introduce knowledge depreciation parameters. Knowledge depreciation
parameter for induced learning could be estimated from historical data and for autonomous
learning could be simulated from the number of breakdowns during the producing process. The
Weibull distribution is adopted to model the occurrence of process interruptions. There are two
supply chain models that we consider, the uncoordinated and the coordinated supply chain. For
each model, we obtain the cost minimizing level of induced learning amount. The suppliers only
make decisions based on their own self-interest in the uncoordinated system. Whereas, for the
coordinated supply chain, their self-interests have been aligned, via incentive contracts, with the
interests of the supply chain.
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The coordinated supply chain benefits from the compounding effect of components variance
reduction. One outcome of this effect is that the level of induced learning for suppliers in the
uncoordinated system is substantially less than that of the coordinated system. Hence, there is a
greater amount of investment in the coordinated supply chain relative to that of the uncoordinated
system. This additional investment could be offset somewhat by the additional income that is
realized from the coordinated supply chain.
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THE COORDINATED SUPPLY CHAIN, A
MICROCOSM OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION: THE COST
MINIMIZING ALLOCATION OF VARIANCE REDUCTION
TARGETS

4.1

Introduction

Circa 1980, leaders of industry had their long-held belief about quality shattered. Their goal of
quality was making 100% of their product within design tolerances. If a customer required better
quality (i.e., tighten the tolerance) then they had to be prepared to pay more. However, this
perception of quality changed dramatically as evidence mounted from researchers like David
Garvin (1984) who reported their fact-based results emerging from the data and analysis of
carefully designed studies that exposed this belief in conformity as inferior to a new quality
paradigm at work which indeed had the heretofore unknown ability to increase quality (increasing
demand) while simultaneously reducing costs. That is, a customer could expect to pay less for
better quality, suggesting a substantially new way for managing a business, that if not followed by
competitors, would result in a company having a higher quality product at a lower cost to the
customer, providing a clear and unambiguous competitive advantage. From an economic
perspective, it provided the discovery of a heretofore unknown variable, having the inherent ability
to simultaneously shift the demand curve up and the supply curve down. That variable was
variation in product performance.

The name of the game had shifted from conformance to specifications to uniformity of all product
performance measures. That is, given a design target, each product would be produced consistently
on target as an identical clone of others. Indeed, variation was espoused as the root cause of poor
quality and that uniformity must replace conformity as the measure of quality. Further, with this
definition, the cost of quality could be well approximated for any symmetric, continuous and
differentiable loss function, by the scaled squared deviation of an observation about a performance
target as follows (Taguchi 1986),
Cos
=
t k (Y − T )

The expected cost is then,

2

(1)
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2
 k σ 2 + ( µ − T )2 
Exp  k (Y − T ) =





(2)

From this relationship, variance reduction has a direct effect on the bottom line. And given the
acceptance of customers that consistent and reliable performance is their measure of quality, we
now have an expression that provides the doubling effect of quality. That is as variation decreases,
there is a double positive effect where quality and demand increase while cost of production or
supply decreases. In addition to perceived higher quality and lower costs, companies carry leaner
inventories as requirements for rework and repair are diminished, reduced service call rates as the
reliability of their product has increased leading to an increase in customer perceived quality of
their product, eliminating the need for the penalizing concessions due to poor quality, and
significantly improving the brand image of their product and the supply chain, leading to not only
an increase in the product’s brand image and market share, but also for other supply chain products
sharing the brand name. They experience production levels that routinely achieve the design
capacity of their manufacturing facilities as evidenced by the increased first pass productivity of
their processes. They further experience a significant drop in working capital over all their
operations, lower insurance premiums given the substantial reduction in reported accidents,
characterized by a cleaner work environment. The incredible full breadth of the benefits of
variance reduction can be well represented by an iceberg where the directly observable or
measurable benefits that accrue from reduced variation, such as reduced rework and repair costs
and decreased warranty costs, are modeled by the tip or observable portion of the iceberg and the
indirect or hidden costs are modeled by the unobservable or below-the-water-level portion of the
iceberg. Much like the iceberg, these hidden or indirect costs, depending on process, industry, etc.,
can be anywhere between 6 to 50 times the tip-of-the-iceberg direct costs, showing the true breadth
of variance reduction’s influence. And, within the confines of the coordinated supply chain, the
influence of variance reduction by any one member has a growing web of influence on the
downstream members of the supply chain through the compounding effect of transmitted variation.
Some reduction in variation will occur, along with the breadth of benefits realized via the iceberg
effects, because of the variance reduction activities undertaken by an upstream supply chain
member, the extent of the reduction depends on the filter of the functional relationships that exist
(to be discussed in detail later, including an example). Another, often neglected yet important
benefit, is the effect of variance reduction on the workforce. Working in a cleaner and safer
environment, conducive to continuous learning and training, where workers are treated as
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respected partners, encouraged, appreciated, recognized and equitably rewarded for their ideas,
providing a workforce that is more confident and trusting of management and management in turn
empowers them to pursue variance reduction activities that as communication technology
increases, their contributions are recorded, becoming a part of the supply chain’s knowledge base
and immediately available to the supply chain.

4.1.1

Learning

So, what drives variation down? The answer while simply stated, yet often difficult to implement,
is learning. The investment in the development of and continuation of training programs that focus
on identifying sources of variation and the sustained effort in mitigating their effect on variation
must be of overriding importance to managers. Frankly, absent continued investments in learning,
understanding what has been learned and the know how to implement what has been learned,
quality falters along with the power of its doubling effect. An untended system will strive toward
its natural more chaotic, entropic state.

It is well known by economists that when parties are acting independently and not part of a
cooperative system, that market results will be sub-optimal as each party, acting in its own selfinterest will place a price margin on their product or service. This is called double marginalization
that along with the magnified demand uncertainties associated with the bullwhip effect
manipulates and distorts the economic demand curve facing the supply chain. These are the
detrimental characteristics which emerge from the “prisoner’s dilemma” and other noncooperative games used in negotiating contracts, lacking trust and open communication and
lacking the incentive to freely share information.

4.1.2

Demonstration of Marginalization

Starting upstream at the root of the supply chain, we have a supplier who places a marginal price
on each unit of product sold to the next downstream member of the supply chain, the manufacturer.
For example, suppose the supplier places a 25% marginal profit on the total cost realized per unit
of product sold, the resulting unit price would be,
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Supplier (per unit cost to the manufacturer):
Margin = 1.25 (Marginal cost)

(8a)

Note: In this scenario, an incentive contract proffered by Jeuland and Shugan (1983) that would
align the self-interest of the supplier with those of the system would be discount pricing where the
buyer receives a discounted price if they place an order that exceeds a predetermined target. The
adjustment feature for this incentive contract is the target which the supplier selects to meet his
expected reservation profit.

Due to increasing pressure from his customers for more reliable products and ever shorter expected
lead times, the manufacturer must find more time to concentrate on the core competencies of his
business. Consequently, he sheds the responsibilities and accountabilities of his non-core business
functions by the increasingly common practice of outsourcing non-core business functions, such
as process maintenance and logistics (Tarakci et. al., 2006). He adopts this strategy with the
intention of enhancing, improving, and maintaining the firm’s commitment to its core
competencies. Of course, each contractor acting independently and in its own self-interest will
place a marginal price on their services, which, in turn will be marginalized when it gets to the
retailor who is next up in our downstream tour. The marginal price that the retailer faces from the
manufacturer is then,

Manufacturer (per unit price to the Retailer):
Margin = 1.25 (Manufacturer’s Marginal Cost)
= 1.25 (1.25 Supplier’s Marginal Cost + 1.25 Contractor’s Marginal
Cost + Marginal Cost incurred from Manufacturer’s added value)
= 1.5625 (Supplier’s Marginal Cost) + 1.5625 (Contractor’s Marginal
Cost) + 1.25 (Manufacturer’s Marginal Cost incurred from his added value

(8b)

Note: An incentive contract for this scenario, including knowledge of the expected costs and
expected times required for maintenance and repairs, was proffered by Tarakci, Tang, Moskowitz
and Plante (2006) where the contractor is given a contract with two adjustable features. The
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payment per unit of uptime operation and a target for achieved uptime operation, beyond which
the contractor would receive a bonus.

The retailer, who is the primary interface with the customer, invests in advertising, brand
management, promotions and other activities in support of product sales and uses a markup of 25%
over his marginal costs, such that the per unit price to the customer is,

Retailer (per unit price to the customer):
Margin =1.25 (Customer’s Marginal Costs)
= 1.25 [ (1.5625 (Supplier’s Marginal Cost) + 1.5625
(Contractor’s Marginal Cost) + 1.25 (Manufacturer’s Marginal Cost)]
+ 1.25 (Retailer’s Marginal Cost incurred from his added value)
= 1.95315 (Supplier’s Marginal Cost) + 1.95315 (Contractor’s Marginal cost) +
+ 1.5625 (Manufacturer’s Marginal Cost) + 1.25 (Retailer’s
Marginal Cost incurred from his added value)

(8c)

For a coordinated supply chain, the marginal price to the Customer is:
Retailer’s Marginal Price = 1.25 [(Supplier’s Marginal Cost)
+ (Contractor’s Marginal Cost)
+ (Manufacturer’s Marginal Cost)
+ (Retailer’s Marginal Cost)]

(9)

The difference between equations (8c) and (9) establishes the difference in price that the
customer experiences as follows,

Delta price = 0.70315 (Supplier’s Marginal Cost) + 0.70315 (Contractor’s Marginal
Cost) + 0.3125 (Manufacturer’s Marginal Cost)

(10)

Clearly, the actual price to the customer is much greater than that intended by the manufacturer
who still only realizes a 25% markup, yet the customer is asked to pay a markup of 56.25%,
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greater than that intended by the Supplier and contractor who still only realize their 25% markup,
yet the customer is asked to pay a markup of 95.135%. The economists have a name for this. They
call it marginalization. We call it the “voodoo” or smoke-and-mirrors curse of a non-coordinated
supply chain where the members are all acting in their own self-interest with a clear detriment to
the supply chain. The difference in profit is subject to the demand curve facing the supply chain.

4.1.3

Environment for Learning

Given the importance of learning as the fundamental force leading to efficient and effective
variance reduction, an informed supply chain must ask itself the following by now familiar and
well-practiced litany of questions: What, why and how should the management of their various
enterprises be structured where everyone in the company has a vested self-interest in continuous
learning? To encourage participation, it is not unusual for a company to establish a credo and an
associated slogan that emphasizes its commitment to establishing an environment conducive to
continuous learning. Here are a few,
“We are all in this together… All for one and one for all… The whole is worth more than the
sum of its parts… What a life we could have if only we would cooperate... all members must

win if the group is to win…”

Economists believe, and we have no evidence to the contrary, that individuals will always act in
their own self-Interests. Hence, to obtain the cooperation that these slogans profess, we must find
a positive means for aligning individuals to the goals of the whole. This can only be achieved using
incentives that are designed to cause individuals to perceive the system’s goals as surpassing their
own self-interests. This requires that incentives should result in leaving the individual no worse
off than what he could have expected to accomplish independently. Interestingly, much has been
learned from recent supply chain research in designing incentive contracts specific to the type of
relationships between the principle agent and the agent involved in the contract negotiation, such
as between a manufacturer and retailers, between manufacturers and suppliers, between
manufacturers and contractors and between suppliers and contractors. To the extent that all these
institutions are aligned within the supply chain, the more likely that cooperation becomes a reality.
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These incentive contracts are the glue that both sustains and maintains a coordinated supply chain
throughout the term of the contract (Alexander, Li and Plante, 2016; Qin and Tang, 2007; Boyaci,
2005; Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). The key to a coordinated supply chain is to achieve the
cooperation of all members where each member benefits. In addition, where knowledge is
exchanged freely and openly to produce a product of value to the customer that is greater than that
which could have been achieved in a non-integrated system. Clearly, evidence is mounting rapidly
as reports from well thought out research combined with reports from well-conducted field studies
are validating the expected benefits predicted from research, as well as unexpected yet related
benefits such as the incredible size and impact of the benefits realized relative to the uncoordinated
and non-cooperative supply chain. We are at a time, similar to the 1980 -paradigm-shifting quality
revolution, where it took staring into the abyss of bankruptcy (often called the wake-up call)
before companies finally had the incentive to go all-in on the heretofore never-recognized yet
exceptionally powerful doubling effect of variance reduction, increasing quality while reducing
cost. Companies that had ignored this are no longer with us today or enjoy (tongue-in-cheek)
significantly diminished capacity to compete effectively. These companies essentially find
themselves in the quicksand of a growing quagmire of confusion and doubt ever-so-slowly sinking,
holding onto and being pulled up by the shoestrings of loyal customers. Such loyalty is misplaced
and most certainly will evaporate if these companies choose to remain outside of the coordinated
supply chain, and persist in the belief that a marginal increase over their costs is the best
mechanism for pricing their products. Much like variance reduction, with theoretical support,
repeatedly validated from growing practice, the coordinated supply chain operates at a
substantially reduced cost and increased quality. This is, in part due to the elimination of the
practice of independent marginalization along with the reduction in variance of the Bullwhip effect.
However, we suggest and actually claim that the great majority of reduced cost and increased
quality experienced by the coordinated supply chain is, again, due to variance reduction. And not
just the variance reductions that occur within a member of the supply chain, but of vital importance,
through the transmission of this variance reduction throughout the entire constellation of the
coordinated supply chain. Much like the stochastic-demand-driven bullwhip effect that begins
small and then grows and thrives in a non-cooperative environment having little communication,
and much like the compounding effect of increasing the cost to the customer from marginalization,
the effect of variance reduction is compounded to all the downstream members of the supply chain.
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Hence, variance reduction, through the compounding effect of transmitted variation is the savior
to the marginalization’s devil. And in this role represents the heaven of Economic cooperation,
from which the once-angels of marginalization have been cast down into the hell of Economic
non-cooperation. It is high time that we accept the fact that a coordinated supply chain dominates
the uncoordinated supply chain. The naïve will depart from the field of competition going quietly
into the night.

Much has been written about the environment within which continuous learning thrives. The
precepts of the learning organization (Senge, 1990), of the extended enterprise and the integrated
supply chain serve as the precursors and motivation for the emergence of the coordinated supply
chain. We envision that a truly coordinated supply chain is a microcosm of economic cooperation
where the manufacturer is the principle in dyadic cooperative games with each member of the
supply chain acting as an agent as envisioned by Zusman, P. and Etgar, M.(1981). Incentive
contracts are negotiated and completed that obtain the cooperation of each agent. Thereby aligning
the self-interest of each agent with that of the supply chain. The design of the incentive contract is
typically initiated by the manufacturer who provides the agent with a contract having an adjustable
feature allowing the agent to select and make an adjustment that provides an expected profit that
achieves the agent’s reservation profit. The reservation profit is essentially the expected profit that
the agent would have realized without involvement as a coordinated member of the supply chain.

To illustrate the combined effects of a coordinated supply chain, we will use a supply chain facing
a partial demand curve and consisting of one supplier, followed by a manufacturer who has
outsourced his non-core business activities to concentrate on improving his core competencies,
followed still by a retailer who provides the interface with the customer. Using this scenario, we
intend to illustrate what is possible under the configuration of a coordinated supply chain,
comparing the coordinated supply chain and the non-coordinated supply chain. For this
comparison, we will determine the cost-minimizing allocation of variance reduction targets for
both the supplier and the manufacturer.
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4.1.4

Compounding effect of Variance Transmitted up through the Supply Chain

The initial variance of our supply chain, assuming probabilistic independence and transmitted
variation absent any learning is,
2
= σ S20 + σ C2 0 + σ M2 0 + σ R2 0
σ SC

(3)

where,
2
σ SC

= The variance/reliability of the Supply Chain that the customer experiences,

σ S20

= The variance/reliability of the Supplier,
= The variance/reliability of the Contractor,
= The variance/reliability of the Manufacturer,
= The variance/reliability of the Retailer,

The variation transmitted up through the supply chain is often miss-understood as the focus is
typically on their own processes. When variation is transmitted, it does so through the filter of a
functional relationship as follows,
2
σ SC
= σ S20 + σ C2 0 + f SM (σ S20 ) + fCM (σ C2 0 ) + σ M2 1 + f SMR (σ S20 ) + fCMR (σ C2 0 ) + f MR (σ M2 0 ) + σ R21

(4)

Example:
The supplier’s product has a performance measure that is a random variable having a variance and
a mean µ , such that,

= µX + e ,
X
where,

e

= a random error term having variance σ S20 and a mean 0.

Following training on the use of process control charts, over adjustment variance was removed
2
from his process and the variance of X has been reduced by σ Sadj
.

Variance is updated/reduced as follows,
2
2
σ=
σ S20 − σ Sadj
S1

Through the proper use of process control charts, the supplier has reduced the noise or variance of
his process, such that the effort or costs (i.e., the sample size or the number of replications in a
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factorial design of experiments), for the identification of a factor or factors that currently are not
precisely controlled but could be to reduce the influence of its variation on the variation of the
performance measure. the supplier creates a 1/2 fractional replicate of a full factorial design for 5
2-level factors. He uses this design to assess the main effects, under the assumption of no
interactive effects of 15 possible factors suspected of influencing the performance measure. Via
this design, the supplier finds a significant relationship between X and a factor under his control,
Z, such that the mean of X is aZ. such that,
X = aZ + e
And the variance has been reduced by,
2
2
σ S21 =σ S20 − σ Sadj
− a 2σ SZ

(5)

The expected cost as a proportion of the initial expected cost for the supplier is,
2
2
2 2
Expected Cost S (new) σ S 0 − σ Sadj − a σ SZ σ S21
= =
σ S20
σ S20
Expected Cost S (new)

(6)

The Manufacturer has also removed over adjustment from his process, and yet unbeknownst to the
manufacturer, the relationship of his performance measure and X is,
=
Y bX + e
The variance of Y is then reduced as,
2
2
2
σ M2 1 = σ M2 0 − σ Madj
− b 2 (σ S20 − σ Sadj
− a 2σ SZ
)

2
2
2
2
2
2 2
Expected Cost M (new) σ M 0 − σ Madj − b (σ S 0 − σ Sadj − a σ SZ ) σ M2 1
= =
σ M2 0
σ M2 0
Expected Cost M (new)

(7a)

(7b)

In a coordinated supply chain, conducive to continuous learning the reduction in variance that is
transmitted and compounded up through the supply chain is the superglue that maintains a
coordinated supply chain to the benefit of all members of the supply chain. However, where does
the funding for supporting managerial investments in continuous learning activities?

Here is our suggestion: The coordinated supply chain, through the elimination of marginalization
and the bullwhip effect, provides more expected profit than the un-coordinated system. We
recommend that the additional profit that is realized by a coordinated system be used to determine
the allocation of learning activities throughout the supply chain that are focused on training for
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variance reduction. Hence, in the next few sections, we develop a model for determining the Cost
minimizing allocation of variance reduction targets throughout the supply chain.

4.2

Theoretical Support

Higher product quality could efficiently bring more revenue to brand owner. Researchers (Gort
and Klepper 1982; Agarwal and Bayus 2002) indicated that product quality improvement results
in demand increase. Bagwell and Riordan (1991) stated that consumers are willing to pay higher
price for better quality product; Mark (2000) further explained that price is a signal to quality in
theoretically. Six Sigma is one of the most fundamental approach to enhance product quality (Hahn
et al. 2000). At the same time, Six Sigma is a popular approach to reduce cost by minimizing waste
and resource (Harry and Schroeder 2000). The key concept of Six Sigma is about product variation
reduction (Walshe et al. 2010). Knowledge Management (KM) and learning curve (Argote and
Epple 1990; Wang et al. 2013; Baily and Farrel 2006) built the connection between organizational
learning process and variation reduction (Moskowitz et al. 2001). The accumulated knowledge is
a primary source of value for the firm (e.g., Grant 1996, Spender 1996), and it benefit customers
by significantly increasing product quality (Ofek and Sarvary 2001). Using a structured approach
(Choo et al., 2007; Lapre´ et al. 2000), KM help the firm to accumulate greater knowledge
(Schroeder et al. 2008). Product performances depend on the components, hence model
considering component compounding effect come out (Plante 2000; Agrawal et al. 2017; Wang et
al. ?). Since brand owner and outsourcer have different optimal learning amounts for themselves
and their partner. They enter into the contract voluntarily because both benefit from cooperation
(Zusman and Etgar 1981). Normally, a feasible incentive contracts to satisfy cooperative supply
chain decision is available to coordinated variation reduction (Bernstein and Kok 2009, Ha 2016,
Dong et al. 2016).

4.3

The Demand Curve

Follow Banker et al. (1998), we use the linear demand curve, linear in product price and quality.

D( P, Q)= Q − bP ,
where,
P

= The marginal or per unit price

b>0

(8)
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Q

= The customer perceived quality

b

= A coefficient representing the rate at which demand decreases price increases

Absent intentional managerial investments to improve product quality through variance reduction,
0
the perceived quality is Q = Q 0 and the corresponding demand is D=
Q 0 − bP . Generally,

decreasing product price or increasing product quality can increase the demand. In our model.
Without loss of generality and to facilitate model development, we will assume that the retailer,
regardless of changes in perceived quality and decreasing costs because of variance reduction
activities, plans to maintain the per unit product price constant at the current level. This is just one
of several possible competitive strategies where the retailer does not wish to send signals to his
competitors.

The manufacturer and supplier have marginal profit functions as follows,
D − C − F
∏ M= P
M
MQ
M

(9)

where,


P
M

= Unit gross profit of the manufacturer

CMQ

= Manufacturer’s quality costs

FM

= Manufacturer’s fixed cost
D − C − F
∏=
P
S
S
SQ
S

(10)

where,

4.4


P
S

= Unit gross profit of the supplier

CSQ

= Supplier’s quality costs

FS

= Supplier’s fixed cost

Quality and Quality Cost

We assume that a manufacturer’s performance linearly depends on a supplier performance X S ,
such that YM = aX S . Accounting for transmitted variation, the variance of the product when it
reaches the customer is then,
=
σ Y2 a 2σ S2 + σ M2 .

(11)
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We also assume that the inverse relationship between quality and variance can be reasonably
represented as,

Q= 1

σ Y2

.

(12)

Then, with scaling parameters, the quality cost as a function of the corresponding variance is k Sσ S2
and kM σ M2 , where k S and kM are positive scaling parameters, for the supplier and manufacturer,
respectively.
Defining eS ≥ 0 and eM ≥ 0 as the induced learning efforts (e.g. investments in training) undertaken
by management to reduce process variance for the supplier and manufacturer, respectively. We
further assume that there are two marginally decreasing convex functions f S (eS ) and f M (eM ) that
capture the proportion of variance remaining for the supplier and manufacturer, respectively,
following a quality improvement exercise, such that, f S (0) = 1 , f S (eS ) ≤ 0 , f e '(eS ) < 0 and
f e ''(eS ) > 0 and similarly for the manufacturer’s. Following the induced learning activities, the
2
remaining variances are σ eS2 = f S (eS )σ S2 and σ eM
= f M (eM )σ M2 for the supplier and manufacturer

respectively.

The investment in induced learning as a function of the efforts of the manufacturer and supplier
are respectively hS eS2 and hM eM2 , such that the total costs are modeled as follows,
Manufacturer,

=
CMQ kM f M (eM )σ M2 + hM eM2

(13)

=
CSQ kS f S (eS )σ S2 + hS eS2

(14)

Supplier,

In the next few sections, we develop the models that determine the profit maximizing quality
improvement allocations, eS ≥ 0 and eM ≥ 0 .
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4.5

Non-coordinated Supply Chain

In a non-coordinated supply chain, both supplier and manufacturer make decisions based on their
own profit function. From the demand curve, we know that

1
1
∆D =
∆Q − D 0 =2 2
− D 0 =2
− D0
2
2
a σ eS + σ eM
a f S (eS )σ S + f M (eM )σ M2

(15)

For manufacturer, he makes decision by maxing the following equation:

∆D − C + C 0 = P
(
∆ ∏ M= P
M
MQ
MQ
M

1
− D 0 ) − k M f M (eM )σ M2 − hM eM2 + k M σ M2
2
a f S (eS )σ + f M (eM )σ M
2

2
S

(16)
To find the optimal quality effort, set

∂∆ ∏ M

∂eM

= 0 , we have:

∂∆ ∏ M 
− f M' (eM )σ M2
'
2
0
=
PM 2
− k=
M f M (eM )σ M − 2hM eM
∂eM
(a f S (eS )σ S2 + f M (eM )σ M2 ) 2

(17)

Thus, the optimal quality effort for manufacturer is a function of quality effort for supplier. From
(17) we have eM = g (eS ) .
The supplier makes her decision by the following function

∆D − C + C 0 = P
(
∆ ∏ S= P
S
SQ
SQ
S

1
− D 0 ) − kS f S (eS )σ S2 − hS eS2 + kSσ S2 (18)
2
a f S (eS )σ + f M (eM )σ M
2

2
S

Replacing eM by g (eS ) , we have

(
=
∆ ∏S P
S

1
− D 0 ) − kS f S (eS )σ S2 − hS eS2 + kSσ S2 .
a f S (eS )σ + f M ( g (es ))σ M2
2

2
S

Hence, the optimal decision for supplier is the solution of

∂∆ ∏ S

∂eS

(19)

= 0.

2 '
2
'
2
∂∆ ∏ S
 a f S (eS )σ S + f M (h(eS ))h '(eS )σ M − k f ' (e )σ 2 − 2h e =
=
−P
0
S
S S
S
S
S S
∂eS
(a 2 f S (eS )σ S2 + f M ( g (eS ))σ M2 ) 2

(20)

By solving equation (20) we have the optimal quality effort for supplier, denoted as eS** , and for the
manufacturer as eM** . The increased demand is ∆D** and the corresponding increased profit are
**
∆ ∏**
S and ∆ ∏ M for the supplier and the manufacturer, respectively. The increased profit for the

non-coordinated supply chain is,
**
∆ ∏ = ∆ ∏**
M +∆ ∏ S .

(21)
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4.6

Coordinated Supply Chain

Combining the profit functions of the supplier and manufacturer, we can represent the change in
profit of the coordinated supply chain, avoiding the effect of double marginalization follows,
∆ ∏CS (eS , eM ) = ∆ ∏ M +∆ ∏ S +∆ ∏ R .

(22)

The optimal solution for the system is eS* and eM* . The corresponding system profit is ∆ ∏*CS and we

 denote the marginal profit for the coordinated supply chain and,
should have ∆ ∏*CS > ∆ ∏* . Let P

>P
+P
 . Solving the following two
due to the elimination of double marginalization, P
M
S
equations, we find the optimal profit maximizing solution eS* and eM* for the coordinated supply
chain as,

− f M' (eM )σ M2
∂∆ ∏ 
= P 2
−=
kM f M' (eM )σ M2 − 2hM eM 0
2
2 2
(a f S (eS )σ S + f M ( g (eS ))σ M )
∂eM

(23)

−a 2 f S' (eS )σ S2
∂∆ ∏ 
= P 2
=
− kS f S' (eS )σ S2 − 2hS eS 0
2
2 2
∂eS
(a f S (eS )σ S + f M ( g (eS ))σ M )

(24)

Theorem: The profit maximizing investments in quality improvement for each member of the
coordinated supply chain, ei* is greater than that of the non-coordinated supply chain, ei** . (proof
provided in Appendix A-7)

Hence, both supplier and manufacturer should invest more on quality effort under the coordinated
system. That is eS* ≥ eS** and eM* ≥ eM** .

Lemma1: The achieved improvement in quality of the profit maximizing solution for the
coordinated supply chain is greater than that of the uncoordinated supply chain.

Lemma 2: The achieved reduction in costs of the profit maximizing solution for the coordinated
supply chain is greater than that of the uncoordinated supply chain.

These lemmas follow directly from the theorem and suggest that the positive doubling effect of
variance reduction is greater in the coordinated supply chain. Hence, the demand curve shifts up
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further under the profit maximizing quality improvement investments of the coordinated supply
chain than under the uncoordinated supply chain.

Figure 6 illustrates these effects on the demand curve under Lemma 2. Without any quality effort,
the average total cost curve (ATC) is the highest. The equilibrium price and quantity can be found
from the intersection between ATC and Demand Curve. The investments in quality improvement
drives the ATC curve down while the investment required to achieve the quality improvement
pushes against this downward movement until both forces are equivalent at the optimal ATC, after
which the level of investments required to achieve the corresponding quality improvement
overtake the realized reduction in costs, causing the ATC curve to move upwards as marginal
investments become less than the marginal reduction in cost realized by addition efforts in quality
improvement.

Figure 6 ATC Shitfing
Figure 7 shows the effect of both Lemmas, wherein variance reduction both drives the ATC curve
down and shifts the demand curve up. Hence, additional profit enters into the system through an
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increase in variance reduction efforts. In Figure 7, the initial demand and ATC is represented by
a solid line; and the shifted demand and ATC curves are represented by dashed lines. Under this
scenario, there are two points in Figure 7 designated by A and B that illustrate several reasonable
price strategies for the coordinated supply chain. For example, they could choose to retain the
current price avoiding the signaling of a price reduction, resulting in the uncertainty surrounding
how competitors might react. Why wake up a sleeping dog? And reaping the rewards of an
increase in demand and improved brand image resulting from customer perceived improvements
in the quality and reliability of its products. Second, they could cooperate with the retailer to lower
the price a bit, calling it a promotional price to move inventory or to introduce new products. If
the competitors follow suit, they will be operating at a loss while you are still, unbeknownst to
them, making a profit. If the supply chain decides to lower the price to the partial market
equilibrium price and competitors follow suit, some of them will not survive. Caution should be
used here, since the psychological price effect on quality could cause customers, who have become
accustomed with paying higher prices for higher quality products, to react to large price reductions
as inconsistent with a higher quality (this is where advertising and promotional messages by the
Supply Chain can correct these perceptions and align them with reality).

Figure 7 ATC & Demand Curve Shifting
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4.7

Numerical Example

In this section, we use a numerical example to demonstrate our analytical results. Namely, (1)
quality effort brings profit to the system; (2) product from the coordinated system has higher
quality; (3) the coordinated system could benefit more from quality improvement. Table 5 has all
the parameters settings. The quality efforts function for manufacturer and supplier areand.
Table 5 Input parameters for the Example Problem
Supplier unit Cost

100

Manufacturer unit cost

100

σ S2

40

σ M2

40

kS

1,500

kM

2,500

hS

80

hM

50

Retailer unit Cost

100

Table 6. contains the results for the example problem. To facilitate a comparative assessment of
the results for both the uncoordinated and the coordinated supply chains, Table 6 has been
formatted such that the 1st row contains the results of the coordinated supply chain. Whereas the
2nd row shows the results achieved by the uncoordinated supply chain. The last row provides the
differences between these differing supply chains. These differences can be used to assess the
extent of benefits, if any, achieved through the time and effort devoted to develop incentive
contracts that have aligned the self-interest of the supplier to those of the supply chain. Thereby
earning the mutual trust and cooperation which defines a coordinated supply chain. And the all to
often encountered distrust and non-cooperative economic games where each party is expected to
make decisions that are in their own self-interests. The Elephant-in-the-room question is: So What?
While sizeable differences have been shown in theory and validated in practice in support of the
expected benefits realized through the removal of marginalization and the mitigation of the
bullwhip effect, can one expect to accrue additional benefits from every day planning activities at
a magnitude sufficient for earning the level of trust and cooperation necessary for achieving the
economic cooperation of the coordinated supply chain worth the effort. The answer, at least for
planning the allocation of quality targets among the members of a supply chain is a resounding
yell-from-the-rooftop, YES.
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Just a cursory glance of these results is enough for this example. Prior to investing in quality, the
results in Table 6 shows that the uncoordinated supply chain earns $516,175 in Total Profit. While
the coordinated supply chain earns a more than twice that, having a Total Profit of $1,196,800 for
a difference of $680,625. Using our suggestion, we would consider this additional profit of the
coordinated supply chain, $680,625, available for allocating investments in induced learning
activities. The optimal investment amount for reducing variance is shown in Table 6 as $413,223,
leaving $267,402 to be shared or more likely invested. The optimal learning investment for the
uncoordinated supply chain is a paltry $374, just .09% of the investment of the coordinated supply
chain, which is efforts are greatest for the supplier in both coordinated and uncoordinated supply
chains. Table 7 shows the expected reduction in variation achieved through training investments.
For both the coordinated and uncoordinated supply chains, the largest proportional reductions in
variance occurred at the supplier. This is not surprising given the compounding effect of the
supplier efforts through transmitted variance reductions.
Table 6 Results for the Example Problem (Profit and Investment)
Profit
W/O Quality Effort
W/ Quality Effort
Difference
Investment in Quality

Uncoordinated
516,175
516,278
103
374

Coordinated
1,196,800
2,646,374
1,149,574
413,223

Difference
680,625
2,130,096
412,849

Table 7 Percentage Variance Reduction
Variance Reduction
Uncoordinated
Coordinated System

Reduction from
supplier
3%
34%

Reduction from
Manufacturer
1%
6%

Further, the proportional reduction in variance achieved by the supplier in the coordinated supply
chain is 34% which is more than ten times that of the uncoordinated supply chain. In addition, the
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proportional reduction in variance experienced by the manufacturer in the coordinated supply
chain is 6 times that of the uncoordinated supply chain.

Finally, the difference between the coordinated system and the uncoordinated system is a
resounding $2,646,374 - $516,278 = $2,130,096 in additional expected profits. For this example,
the coordinated supply chain had more than 5 times the expected profit of the uncoordinated supply
chain. While we had anticipated that the coordinated supply chain would prevail, we did not expect
the order of magnitude difference between these two systems that we observe.

4.8

Summary of this Chapter

The not so obvious deleterious effect of marginalization is known to be eliminated by the formation
of a coordinated supply chain. A coordinated supply chain is a connected system of suppliers,
contractors, manufacturers and retailers working in cooperative dyadic relationships where each
member’s self-interest has been aligned with the interest of the supply chain. These aligned
interests are obtained by a coordinator of the supply chain, usually a manufacturer, via situationspecific incentive contracts that have been proposed and analyzed in relatively recent research for
incentive contracts between a manufacturer and a supplier (price discounts, Jeuland and Shugan
(1983)), between a manufacturer and a contractor (Bonus Uptime, Tarakci, Tang, Moskowitz and
Plante (2006)) and between a manufacturer and a Retailer (Revenue Sharing. Cachon and Lariviere
(2005) and Commission/Compensation, Boyagi (2005)). Generally, an initial incentive contract
proposal is offered, wherein the contractor is permitted to make one or two adjustments, within
certain ranges, to modify the contract such that the expected profit exceeds the contractor’s
reservation profit. The characteristics of a coordinated supply chain include a level of trust and
open communication among its members that assures cooperation in the creation of information
and the sharing of information in real time, together amassing an accessible data base of knowledge
that becomes the supply chains currency establishing its competitive position in the marketplace.
Given the real-time communication of the coordinated supply chain, it is salve for the ills wrought
on by the bullwhip effect. In combination, the elimination of marginalization and the muting of
the bullwhip effect in coordinated supply chains has motivated several ongoing research efforts
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that should encourage practical implementation. However, much like the resistance experienced
at the outset of the quality revolution there remains resistance to this notion of a coordinated supply
chain. Managers, who for decades have played the uncooperative economic games of competition
have difficulty in believing that a system based on trust and open communication can prevail.

In this Chapter, we suggest that the tipping point greatly in favor of the coordinated supply chain
is the concept embedded in targeted learning. That is training programs should be targeted toward
variance reduction. Indeed, variance reduction is the only investment decision that has the doubling
effect of increasing quality while reducing costs. We further study this concept as it is reflected in
the partial economic demand curve where advances in variance reduction simultaneously shifts
the demand curve up while shifting the supply curve down. Finally, the nail in the coffin for the
demise of the uncoordinated supply chain is transmitted variation. Like variance reduction,
transmitted variation thrives on the open communication, sharing, cooperation and trust of the
coordinated supply chain. As such the coordinated supply chain provides a microcosm of
Economic Cooperation.

Given the importance of learning, we develop a model for determining the optimal investment for
a supply chain in training programs. We applied the model to both the uncoordinated and the
coordinated supply chains. The results of our research strongly suggest that there is an order of
magnitude difference between the uncoordinated and the coordinated systems. The investments in
learning of the coordinated system are much higher than those of the uncoordinated system. It
follows that there is a much greater positive impact on the demand curve since a greater reduction
in variance has been achieved. Further, given the additional profit that is realized by the
coordinated supply chain, this provides the source of additional funds that can be used for
investments in training throughout the supply chain.
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SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH

This dissertation investigates several important problems within a supply chain as the system
continuously to improve product quality. Chapter 2 examines the quality improvement model
when the end product has several performances and each performance measurement depends on
the quality of components. Different from the traditional learning curve (Fine 1986, Li and
Rajagopalan 1998b) or the improved learning curve (Weijia et al 2013), we introduce

comprehensive learning curve in order to improve the product quality by variance reduction
through the supply chain. The comprehensive learning curve take autonomous learning, induced
learning along with their respective knowledge depreciation into account. This learning model can
better understand organizational learning effect and provide a better instruction for manufacturer
system to invest in employees training (induced learning). In order to reduce the end product
measurement variation, Chapter 2 proposes the model improving quality from suppliers
components by investing in induced learning. This model optimizes over one-period ahead, which
utilize the previous information to continually assess and update on the parameters in the model in
a dynamic production environment. Moreover, this Chapter provides a sensitivity analysis to
investigate those factors affecting the amount of induced learning investment. There are several
contribution in the Chapter 2. On one hand, it shows that faster learning speed could efficiently
reduce product measurement and hence improve product quality. On the other hand, it indicates
that knowledge depreciation hinder quality improvement. Such detriment will lead to an increase
of variance and an expensive system quality cost. There are two kinds of knowledge
depreciation—forgetting and knowledge decay. Forgetting is caused by disruption during the
producing process and knowledge decay is disruption after training. Therefore, accounting for both
forgetting and knowledge decay, the optimum investment strategy necessarily requires additional
investment in induced learning. A proper solution concerning the induced learning amount could
be obtained by debilitating calculation. In short, accounting for both forgetting and knowledge
decay, the optimum investment strategy necessarily requires additional investment in induced
learning. Besides the basic solution, the changed of parameters also affects the solution largely.
Further, since the presence of knowledge decay weakens the counteractive effect of induced
learning, quality improvement targets are adjusted accordingly.
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Chapter 3 primarily focus on the quality improvement along the dyadic supply chain. Based on
Chapter 2 and Plante (2000), this Chapter introduced interaction effect among components. Hence,
a more general model is developed in this Chapter. At the same time, this Chapter consider
suppliers, brand-owner’s behavior when they facing quality improvement.

Quality improvement in this Chapter is the same as Chapter 2. Product quality is estimated by
several performance measurements, and each performance depends on outsourced components.
These components have interaction effect, approximated in the quadratic form. Therefore, quality
improvement of the end product is transmitted to each supplier. Followed Chapter 2, the quality is
estimated by measurement variance, which is rooted from Taguchi (1986). Lower variance
indicates better product quality and comprehensive learning curve, introduced in Chapter 2, is used
to control the variance. The managerial activity, which adopts comprehensive learning curve, is
investment in induced learning. In Chapter 2, we just give an estimation of forgetting. In order to
better simulating forgetting effect, this model considers forgetting is caused by machine downtime
or process disruption. This Chapter used Weibull distribution to approximate such disruption. It is
suggested by Tarakci et al. (2006). This chapter provides existence proofs of the optimal induced
learning amount for every suppliers. However, under dyadic supply chain, each supplier want to
minimize her own cost, a suboptimal solution exists for each supplier. Since components have
compounding effect on the end product, the optimal induced learning amount is greater than the
sub-optimal induced learning amount. Under to suboptimal solution strategy, a reservation cost is
obtained for each supplier. More investment is necessary for each components supplier under the
coordinated system. In order to coordinate the system and guarantee each supplier invest in the
optimal amount, an incentive reasonable from the manufacturer to each supplier. Since the
coordinated system has less quality cost than the dyadic supply chain, the manufacturer still get
additional benefits after the incentives. Last, a numerical example is used to illustrate our model.
The solution of the numerical example perfect matches our theoretical conclusion.

In Chapter 4, a more general model is extended from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. From previous
Chapters we know that proper investment in induced learning is actually bringing the quality cost
down. This is because such quality effort bringing the product variation down. With lower
variation, product perform high quality. This Chapter considers these two aspects. In general,
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quality investment not only saves quality cost, but also creates additional demand. To better
simulate the coordinated system, this Chapter considers the assembling variance as well. Taguchi
(1986) connected quality cost to variance. Comprehensive learning curve further connect variance
into quality investment. All these model is limited to quality cost area. This Chapter makes
connection between variance and product quality. What’s more, in order to understand component
effects through the whole supply chain, this model illustrates the compounding effect; in order to
understand benefits from the coordinated system, this model illustrate the marginality. The
contribution of this Chapter is obvious, under to coordination, the system requires more quality
efforts, and there is more profits with coordination. Since coordinated system could create more
profit than dyadic supply chain, the additional profit could be used to quality improvement. There
are two accompanying conclusion based on it: under the coordinated system, product perform
better in the sense of quality and the quality cost is less. This Chapter also discuss the price strategy
after quality improving. Basically, there are three strategies. First, they could maintain the same
price to keep a stable market. Second, just lower the price to the profit maximization point to get
the highest profit. Alternatively, lower the price to the average total cost, this strategy will occupy
the whole market and become a monopoly in future. By the end of this Chapter, a numerical
example is used to show the contributions. The example used the price strategy one. It shows that
marginality reduced the profit indeed. In addition, the additional profit create by the coordination
can be used to reinvest into quality improvement, which will bring more profit in further.

This research provides substantial insights into the impact of comprehensive learning curve and
collaborative quality improvement efforts as well as manufacturer and suppliers’ quality
investment strategy. There are still several unanswered interesting questions. First, coordinates
system create additional profit, how to allocate the additional profit among the suppliers and the
brand-owner in order to realize the planned strategy? In our research, we just assumes that
everyone gets at least the reservation profit. A quantitative model could extend this and a feasible
solution with the changing of parameters need further discuss. Second, our models assumes perfect
information exchange among the supply chain. Nevertheless, asymmetric information structure
often exists within supply chains and requires consideration of coordination and contracting.
Despite the prevalence of research efforts regarding asymmetric information in other contexts (i.e.,
inventory problems), similar research is scarce in the context of manufacturer and suppliers'
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coordination regarding quality-based learning (Kim 2000) and provides a topic for future research.
A third potential research is extended the supplier into a more general form. The suppliers in our
model only provide the components to one manufacturer. In the reality, the suppliers provide
components to multiple manufacturer, and they have competitor as well. A model considering
component quality and obtained additional profit is desired from supplier’s view.
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APPENDIX

For sensitivity analysis, we first note that the optimal li*,t can never be negative because the second
term of (25) is a decreasing function of li ,t , so li ,t = 0 is always a better solution than any negative
value.

To solve the optimal investment in induced learning, we set (26) to zero to obtain the following
necessary condition for the optimal :
− ( λi ,I +1)

l (1 + bi ) 

li ,t  bi + i ,t
=
2 Li (t − 1) 


l (1 + bi ) 

(li ,t ) li ,t  bi + i ,t
Let f=

2 Li (t − 1) 


 li ,t (1 + bi ) 
− λi , A

gi ,t (1 + ai ) 

 2 Li (t − 1)  v
.

X i ( t )  ai +
2hi qi2
2 Li (t − 1) 


λi , I 

(A.1)

λi ,I +1

, for li ,t ≥ 0 . Obviously, f (li ,t ) is a strictly increasing function

of li ,t .

A-1. Directional Effect of Knowledge Depreciation, ( ai , bi ).
Mathematically, if ai increases, then βi in (27) decreases and, consequently, the right side of (A.1)
will decrease. This in turn implies a smaller f (li ,t ) on the left side of (A.1). But because f (li ,t ) is a
strictly increasing function of li ,t , the optimal li*,t must be smaller as a result of an increasing ai .
With respect to the expected total cost, assume ai increases to ai . Let li*,t (ai ) and li*,t (ai ) denote the
corresponding optimal investments in induced learning. From (25), it is obvious that
TEC X i (t ) (ai , li*,t (ai )) ≤ TEC X i (t ) (ai , li*,t (ai )) . Furthermore, since li*,t (ai ) is the optimal investment for
induced learning corresponding to ai , we must have TEC X i (t ) (ai , li*,t (ai )) ≤ TEC X i (t ) (ai , li*,t (ai )) .
Combining the last two inequalities, we show the minimum TEC X i (t ) decreases when ai increases.
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Next, we consider the influence of bi , which describes the proportion of knowledge a supplier can
retain from previous training/induced learning. Mathematically, we see from (A.1) that there is
no explicit solution for the optimal li*,t . Actually, the optimal li*,t is an implicit function of bi . In
order to find the directional effects, we will use the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) as follows.
For all li ,t ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ bi ≤ 1 , define F (bi , li ,t ) =

∂TEC X i (t )
∂li ,t

, then we have the following partial

derivatives:

λi , I βi 

li ,t (1 + bi ) 
Fbi
=
 bi +

2 Li (t − 1) 
2 Li (t − 1) 

− ( λi ,I + 2)

λi , I (1 + bi )(2 Li (t − 1) + li ,t
2 Li (t − 1)

+1 ≥ 0 ,

and

li ,t (1 + bi ) 
(1 + bi )
1 + ai 
βi
Fli ,t =
2hi qi + λi , I (λi , I + 1)
γi +

2 Li (t − 1) 2 Li (t − 1) 
2 Li (t − 1) 
By the IFT, any solution( bi , li ,t )to F = 0 must satisfy

− ( λi ,I +1)

> 0.

∂li ,t

Fb
=
− i ≤ 0 . This result implies that a
∂bi
Fli ,t

larger bi gives a smaller optimal li*,t . Finally, we can follow the same argument as for ai to show that

TEC X i (t ) in (25) decreases as bi increases.

In summary, we conclude that, if the knowledge detention parameters for the autonomous and
induced learning increase, both investment in induced learning and total expected cost will
decrease.

A-2. Directional Effect of Planned Production gi ,t .
According to Dorroh et al. (1994), planned production, minimizing total expected cost, should
increase over the planning horizon. Therefore, having a relatively greater gi ,t for the current period,
the amount of accumulative knowledge will be comparatively larger and the expected total cost is
expected to be lower. From (27), a larger gi ,t will lead to a smaller βi , and hence a smaller li*,t .
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To study the effect of gi ,t on the expected total cost, we re-write the necessary condition for
optimality as (c.f. (26))

li ,t (1 + bi ) 
1 + bi 
=
2h q l λi , I βi
 bi +

2 Li (t − 1) 
2 Li (t − 1) 
2
i i i

− ( λi ,I +1)

.

(A.2)

When li*,t is smaller (as a result of a smaller gi ,t ), the left side of (A.2) is smaller. So, maintaining
the equality, the right side has to be smaller as well. Since the optimal li*,t is always non-negative,
a smaller li*,t results in a smaller first term of the expected total cost in (25). The second term can be
rewritten as
g (1 + ai ) 

v X i ( t )  ai + i ,t

2Gi (t − 1) 
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2 Li (t − 1) 


− λi ,I −1

li ,t (1 + bi )
2 Li (t − 1)
1 + bi
λi , I
2 Li (t − 1)

bi +

where the first term is exactly equal to the right side of (A.2). The last ratio above also becomes
smaller as li*,t decreases. Hence, the total expected cost in (25) is smaller when gi ,t increases.

To summarize, a higher full-capacity production proportion gi ,t leads to a smaller induced learning
investment li ,t and a smaller total expected cost TEC X i (t ) .

A-3. Directional Effect of Prior Variance σ X2 i (t −1)
If the prior variance σ X2 i (t −1) increases, the quality cost should increase, and the investment in
learning should increase to offset the effect increasing variance. Intuitively, since the system is
relatively less stable resulting in a greater cost of quality, the company should invest more in
training. In this scenario, the quality cost is comparatively higher and additional investment in
induced learning is recommended (Dorrah et al. (1994)).
Mathematically, a larger σ X2 i (t −1) leads to a larger v X i (t ) in (24). Hence, the left side of (A.1) is strictly
increasing in li ,t . Thus, as v X i (t ) increases, the right side of (A.1) increases and, for the equality to
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hold, the optimal li*,t has to increase as well. To estimate the effect of σ X2 i (t −1) on TEC X i (t ) , we will
use the same argument that we used for assessing the effect of increasing bi . Both the first term
and second term of (25) increase due to a larger σ X2 i (t −1) . Thus, a larger variance σ X2 i (t −1) leads to a
greater investment in induced learning and a relatively higher expected total cost TEC X i (t ) .

A-4. Directional Effect of the Induced Learning Parameter, λi , I

λi , I is the induced learning parameter and, if increased, the system has a better use of the existing
knowledge, the expected total cost TEC X i (t ) will decrease. Similar to the analysis for a , a larger

λi , I will lead to a smaller TEC X (t ) .
i

Since li ,t is an implicit function of λi , I , we have

Fλi , I

li ,t (1 + bi ) 
1 + ai 
=
− βi
γi +

2 Li (t − 1) 
2 Li (t − 1) 

− ( λi ,I +1)

li ,t (1 + bi ) 
1 + ai 
=
− βi
γi +

2 Li (t − 1) 
2 Li (t − 1) 

− ( λi ,I +1)

li ,t (1 + bi ) 
1 + ai 
=
− βi
γi +

2 Li (t − 1) 
2 Li (t − 1) 

− ( λi ,I +1)

li ,t (1 + bi ) 
1 + ai 
− λi , I βi
γi +

2 Li (t − 1) 
2 Li (t − 1) 

− ( λi ,I +1)

li ,t (1 + bi ) 
1 + ai 
− λi , I βi
γi +

2 Li (t − 1) 
2 Li (t − 1) 
(1 + λi , I ln(

ln(

1
)
li ,t (1 + bi )
γi +
2 Li (t − 1)

− ( λi ,I +1)

ln(

Li (t − 1)
)
Li (t )

Li (t − 1)
))
Li (t )

According to the IFT, we obtain

li ,t (1 + bi ) 
1 + ai 
βi
γi +

2 Li (t − 1) 
2 Li (t − 1) 

∂li ,t

− ( λi ,I +1)

1 + λi , I ln(

Li (t − 1)
)
Li (t )

Fλ
=
− i ,I =
,
− ( λi ,I +1)
Fli ,t
∂λi ,t
li ,t (1 + bi ) 
(1 + bi )
1 + ai 
2hi qi + λi , I (λi , I + 1)
βi
γi +

2 Li (t − 1) 2 Li (t − 1) 
2 Li (t − 1) 
so the sign of

∂li ,t

∂λi , I

depends on the sign of 1 + λi , I ln( Li (t − 1) / Li (t )) since other factors on the

right side are all positive. For some manufacturers, the accumulated induced learning knowledge
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increases over the entire production horizon, we have Li (t − 1) / Li (t ) ≤ 1 and thus

ln( Li (t − 1) / Li (t )) ≤ 0 . As we can see, there exist a λ i , I such that 1 + λi , I ln( Li (t − 1) / Li (t )) =
0.
Then, ∂li ,t / ∂λi , I ≥ 0 for λi , I ≤ λ i , I , and ∂li ,t / ∂λi , I ≤ 0 for λi , I ≥ λ i , I . So, we can conclude that as λi , I
increases, li*,t first increases and then decreases. On the other hand, if Li (t − 1) / Li (t ) > 1 at time t,
we have ∂li ,t / ∂λi , I ≥ 0 , and we’ll always have an increasing li*,t when λi , I increases. The reason for
it is very simple. Li (t − 1) / Li (t ) > 1 means accumulated induced knowledge decreases for the
current period, or, the accumulated induced knowledge is not as sufficient as before. While λi , I
increase, it indicates that a better training program is introduced, at this time, it is very natural to
invest more into the new efficient training program in order to get extraordinary induced
knowledge.

A-5. Derivations of Performance Variances
From (2) and (7) we can get the variance of Y j ,t −1 as:

σ k2,t −1 E ( yk ,t −1 − mk ) 2
=
N

N −1

         = E (∑ ai(,kt −)1 zi + ∑
i= 1

N
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(k )
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i = 1 j = i +1

z z j )2

N −1 N
(k )
(k )
2
ij ,t −1 i j
ij ,t −1 i j
1
1
1 j=
1 j=
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i +1
i=
i +1
N

N −1

N

         = E ((∑ ai(,kt −)1 zi ) 2 + 2∑ ai(,kt −)1 zi ∑
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N
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2
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∑ (a
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2
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).

Similarly, we have:
=
σ k2,t

N

N −1

∑ (ai(,kt ) )2 + ∑
i= 1

N

∑ (a

i = 1 j = i +1

(k ) 2
ij ,t

)

Furthermore, from the transformation process, we know that ai(,kt ) ∝ σ i ,t and ai(jk,t) ∝ σ i ,tσ j ,t . So, we
have:
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ai(,kt ) = ai(,kt )

σ i ,tσ j ,t
σ i ,t
and ai(jk,t) = aij( k,t)−1
.
σ i ,t −1
σ i ,t −1σ j ,t −1

Hence, we have the first equality in equation (8).

A-6. Convexity of Performance Variance
From (8),

σ
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is positive, and when i = N, = 0.

Since the variance of performance k above is the sum of terms in, if each terms is convex, then is
convex. Now, for the i-th term,
 β L + l 
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 l

For the first term, the second order derivative of 1 + i ,t

βi Li ,t −1 

 l

And the coefficient of 1 + i ,t

β
L
i i ,t −1 


− λI ,i

− λI ,i

with respect to li ,t is positive.

is clearly positive, since si ,t , (ai(,kt −)1 ) 2 and βi

− λI ,i

are all

positive constants. Thus, the first part of the last equation is convex.
The second part is a sum of terms, and, if each of these functions is convex, the sum is
convex too. Similarly to part 1, each of the coefficients (i.e, (aij( k,t)−1 ) 2 , si ,t , s j ,t , βi

− λI ,i

and β j

− λI , j

) is

positive. To complete the proof of convexity for our case, we need to show that the product is
convex. Since the denominators are positive constants, we can use the general expression of

h ( x, y ) =
(1 + x) − a (1 + y ) − b with x, y ≥ 0 , to prove the convexity of the products. We can show the
convexity by its Hessian:

hxx ( x, y ) hxy ( x, y )
det(∇ 2 h( x, y )) =
hyx ( x, y ) hyy ( x, y )
            =

a (a + 1)(1 + x) − a − 2 (1 + y ) − b
ab(1 + x) − a −1 (1 + y ) − b −1

ab(1 + x) − a −1 (1 + y ) − b −1
b(b + 1)(1 + x) − a (1 + y ) − b − 2

            
= (a (a + 1)b(b + 1) − a 2b 2 )(1 + x) −2 a − 2 (1 + y ) −2b − 2
            
= ab(a + b + 1)(1 + x) −2 a − 2 (1 + y ) −2b − 2 ≥ 0
Also, since hxx ( x, y ) = a (a + 1)(1 + x) − a − 2 (1 + y ) − b ≥ 0 and hyy ( x, y ) = b(b + 1)(1 + x) − a (1 + y ) − b − 2 ≥ 0 ,
the Hessian of h( x, y ) is positive definite.

A-7. Dyadic Supply Chain vs. Coordinated system
From (3), we have

P
M

− f M' (eM** )σ M2
(a f S (e )σ + f M (e )σ )
2

**
S

2
S

**
M

2 2
M

2hM eM**
− k M f M' (eM** )σ M2 =

The first term on the left side is the marginal profit from selling extra product and the second term
on the left side is the marginal quality cost saving by quality effort. In total, the left side is the
marginal revenue by manufacturer quality effort, which is always positive. Since the property of ,
we know that the marginal revenue is decreasing. The right side means the marginal quality effort
cost, a linear function. If the left side and right side get the same value, which means the marginal
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revenue equal the marginal cost, the manufacturer stop to invest in quality efforts. From (7) we
know that the marginal revenue under the coordinated system is always great than the
manufacturer’s marginal revenue, though the marginal is decreasing as well. Hence, an increased
quality effort from manufacturer is required. There is an intuition behind it. Marginal profit from
selling is increased, the current marginal quality effort cost is less than the marginal total profit.
To maximize the total profit, the manufacturer must keep investing in quality effort. This relation
can be shown by the graph (Figure 8). As we can see from the graph, higher marginal revenue will
lead the manufacturer invest more on quality effort. Based on this, we can easily to find that
supplier must invest more on quality effort as well.

Figure 8 Marginal Revenue Effect
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